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In 2006, five children in Michigan were diagnosed with severe
congenital neutropenia (SCN), a rare blood disease, which puts them at risk
for leukemia and requires daily injections of a costly medication to prevent
infection.' Although SCN only affects one in five million children, there is
a fifty percent chance that an affected child will pass the gene defect to
future offspring.2 The specialist who diagnosed the Michigan children, Dr.
Laurence A. Boxer, discovered that the children had more than just SCN in
common-they also had the same father, Donor F827.
All five children were conceived through artificial insemination4 using
sperm provided by an anonymous donor and purchased from a sperm bank,
International Cryogenics.' Because none of the children's mothers carried
the defective gene, Dr. Boxer theorized that Donor F827 carried the gene
only in his sperm cells; otherwise he would have exhibited symptoms and
the condition would have been detectable.6 Dr. Boxer could not, however,
test his hypothesis because Donor F827 had moved, International
Cryogenics could not locate him, and the donor's remaining samples could
not be tested without his consent.
Upon learning of the children's condition, International Cryogenics
disposed of Donor F827's remaining samples to ensure that they were not
provided for future use.8 Yet despite the fact that Donor F827 fathered at
least eleven known children through his deposits with the sperm bank,
International Cryogenics failed to notify other recipients of Donor F827's
sperm that their children may also have SCN, reasoning that "even if other
children had developed the disease their families would already know it."9
The Michigan case illustrates the risks associated with the current artificial
insemination practice-a system where sperm is sold by a self-regulated
industry, without laws limiting the number of pregnancies per donor or
requiring donor-tracking, and where donor anonymity is protected to the
1. Denise Grady, As the Use ofDonor Sperm Increases, Secrecy Can Be a Health Hazard, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 2006, at F5, available at 2006 WLNR 9651819.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Artificial insemination is a reproductive procedure in which sperm is manually implanted
into the recipient's cervix or uterine lining. Dawn R. Swink & J. Brad Reich, Caveat Vendor:
Potential Progeny, Paternity, and Product Liability Online, 2007 BYU L. REv. 857, 860 n.14
(2007).
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detriment of the resulting offspring.'o
During the twentieth century, artificial insemination by donor (AID)
steadily gained popularity as an alternative method of reproduction."
Today, sperm banking is a multi-million dollar industry, and AID produces
approximately 30,000 births annually. 12  As the sperm banking industry
grew progressively more corporate and concentrated, AID became
increasingly consumer-dominated. 3  Yet as the nature of the practice
evolved from a physician-dominated infertility treatment to a modem
market-driven commercial transaction, AID has remained enveloped in
secrecy and lacking comprehensive regulation.14 While many states have
statutorily determined the legal parentage of offspring produced through
AID,'5 other issues remain unresolved concerning the relative rights and
obligations of the many potentially involved parties-including the recipient
woman, her spouse, the resulting child, the treating physician, the sperm
bank, and the sperm donor.
Many questions surround the issue of legal liability when a child
produced through AID inherits a genetic disease or defect from the sperm
donor. 16 One such question is whether the sale of human sperm constitutes
the sale of a product, potentially subjecting sperm to products liability law."
This question, in turn, begets many more questions-both legal and
normative-that must be considered before determining whether products
liability law is an appropriate mechanism for regulating artificial
insemination: Can an AID recipient and her spouse bring a products liability
action against the physician administering AID, the sperm bank, or the
10. Id.
I1. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 234-40 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 228-37 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 246-57, 259 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
16. Although one might also consider legal liability in the seemingly analogous situation of a
child inheriting a genetic disease from an egg donor, such questions are beyond the scope of this
Comment. Due to the significant differences in the retrieval and implantation processes of donated
sperm and eggs, the analysis within this Comment applies only to the former. See Amy Shelf, A
Need to Know Basis: Record Keeping, Information Access, and the Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1047, 1056, 1063 (2000) (comparing the different
technology required for retrieving and implanting sperm with that for harvesting ova and implanting
embryos). For further discussion of the potential liability of egg donors, see Suriya E.P. Jayanti,
Comment, Guarantors of our Genes: Are Egg Donors Liable for Latent Genetic Disease?, 58 AM.
U. L. REv. 405 (2008); J. Brad Reich & Dawn Swink, You Can't Put the Genie Back in the Bottle:
Potential Rights and Obligations of Egg Donors in the Cyberprocreation Era, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 1 (2010).
17. See infra notes 314-76 and accompanying text.
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sperm donor?18  Can the resulting child bring such a claim? 9  Can an
anonymous sperm donor be held liable for "manufacturing" a defective
product? 20  Should he be liable if he had no reason to know of his
condition? 21 Is strict liability in tort an appropriate remedy where a genetic
defect is extremely rare, impossible to diagnose, or undiscovered at the time
of insemination? 22  Should an AID recipient alone bear the expense of
raising a child with a severe genetic defect where other parties profited from
the creation of the child?23 This Comment attempts to answer these and
other questions regarding the possibility of regulating AID through products
liability law.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of products liability law
and the history of artificial insemination in the United States. 24 Part II also
discusses Donovan v. Idant Laboratories, a case in which a mother and child
brought a products liability action against a sperm bank based on a genetic
defect inherited by the child from the sperm donor, introducing the
possibility of treating sperm as a product.25 Part III analyzes the potential
success of products liability actions for genetically defective sperm. Part
IV argues that strict products liability is not an appropriate response to the
risks of artificial insemination and instead suggests that courts apply a
shifted burden of proof to claims brought in negligence.27 Part IV further
suggests the need for a national donor database.2 8 Part V concludes.29
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION, AND AN UNLIKELY
UNION
A. Products Liability: The Love Child of Torts & Contracts
A party who commercially transfers a harm-causing product may be
liable under products liability law if the product is defective or does not
conform to the quality represented. 30  The practice of imposing liability on
product providers is nothing new: although the doctrine of caveat emptor-
18. See infra notes 405-13 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 414-21 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 398-404 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 429 and accompanying text.
22. See infra note 433 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 422-52 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 30-264 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 265-305 accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 306-421 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 422-52 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 453-64 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 465-69 and accompanying text.
30. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 1 (2d ed., Thompson/West 2008).
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meaning "buyer beware"-guided early American law,' the foundations of
the modem products liability doctrine have been present since the laws of
ancient Rome. 32 It was not, however, until the mid-twentieth century that
"products liability" was first recognized in the United States as a distinct
area of law.33 Since emerging as an independent doctrine, products liability
has expanded rapidly,34 with "roughly 20,000 products liability decisions of
some significance now reported in the United States.""
The American legal system has long divided civil obligation into two
distinct categories-tort and contract.36 This division is apparent even at the
definitional level: "tort" is defined as "[a] civil wrong, other than breach of
contract, for which a remedy may be obtained.",'n The distinction between
tort and contract is based on the source of the obligation: a contract
obligation is "voluntarily assumed (or at least the transaction that gave rise
to the obligation was voluntarily entered into),"3 while a tort obligation is
"blundered or stumbled into through accident, negligence or fraud." 39
Where, however, voluntary transactions give rise to accidental, negligent, or
fraudulent injury, tort and contract "merge or blur at the edges."40 It was
from this edge-this mixture of tort and contract-that products liability was
born.41
As American society abandoned the principle of caveat emptor42 and
31. Id. at 17.
32. See id. at 11-14 (discussing seller liability for express misrepresentations and breach of an
implied warranty of quality under early Roman law).
33. Dix W. NOEL & JERRY J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: CASES & MATERIALS I (2d ed.
1982) (stating that products liability "did not appear as a heading in the Index to Legal Periodicals
before the volume covering 1961 to 1964").
34. See W. KIP VlscusI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 6 (1991) ("The widespread
perception that there has been a major expansion of the products liability system is correct.").
35. OWEN, supra note 30, at 5.
36. Grant Gilmore, Products Liability: A Commentary, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 103, 111 (1970).
37. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1526 (8th ed. West 2004) (emphasis added).
38. Gilmore, supra note 36, at 111.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. OWEN, supra note 30, at 4. The moral basis for imposing liability on providers of harm-
causing products depends on the voluntary nature of the transaction: "By choosing to expose product
users and others to certain types and degrees of risk, product makers appropriate to themselves
certain interests in safety-in bodily integrity-that may belong to those other persons." David G.
Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 427, 430 (1993) [hereinafter Owen, Moral Foundations].
42. See NOEL & PHILLIPS, supra note 33, at 32 ("The development of the law of products
liability has been closely connected with the change in the commercial world from the principle of
caveat emptor-let the buyer beware-to one which demands that the seller beware.").
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relaxed the requirement of privity, 43 products liability grew out of its tort
and contract roots and into a life of its own":
Principles of responsibility for accidental harm give the doctrine its
torts flavor, and a heritage of contract law conveys the requirement
of a commercial setting-which is one of the very few defining
criteria of a products liability case. The injurious product stands for
both tortious conduct and the betrayal of a promise.45
With its mixed heritage, a products liability action may be founded on either
traditional tort or contract principles-or a hybrid of the two. 46 As such, the
plaintiffs claim may be based on any combination of negligence, breach of
warranty, and strict liability in tort. 47
Because products liability has blurred the distinction between tort and
contract and has developed without plainly established limitations, it is not
always entirely clear what falls within the scope of products liability law.48
Questions concerning the outer boundaries of the products field arise when
"the injury-producing 'product' [is] something other than a typical, mass-
produced chattel-such as a house, a toxic substance, a recipe, electricity, a
truckload of sand, an internet game, transfused blood, or a poisonous spider
in a pair of pants."49 As a result, whether a products liability action is
feasible depends upon whether the item transferred is a product, the
transaction is properly categorized as a sale, and the defendant is an
appropriate party.so
In any products liability claim, the threshold question is thus whether
the thing that caused the plaintiffs injury is, in fact, a "product.""
43. Id. at 33. Initially, "in product cases a contractual relationship, or privity of contract, was
required between the parties even when negligence was alleged." Id at 32. The decline of privity,
however, has since extended liability in the products field to defendants not party to a contract, while
simultaneously permitting recovery by plaintiffs not party to a contract. Id.
44. See id at I (stating that "the products field includes both tort and contract theories"); see also
ANITA BERNSTEIN, A PRODUCTS LIABILITY ANTHOLOGY 47 (1995) ("Products liability is widely
understood to be the progeny of tort and contract ancestors.").
45. BERNSTEIN, supra note 44, at 47.
46. DERRICK OWLES, THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(1978).
47. Courts may "utilize the terminology of negligence, strict liability, or the implied warranty of
merchantability" to define liability based on a product defect. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODS. LIAB. § I cmt. a (1998).
48. See infra notes 314-45 and accompanying text.
49. OWEN, supra note 30, at 3.
50. Id.
51. Section 19 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability defines "product" as
follows:
(a) A product is tangible personal property distributed commercially for use or
consumption. Other items, such as real property and electricity, are products when
the context of their distribution and use is sufficiently analogous to the distribution
and use of tangible personal property that it is appropriate to apply the rules stated
1180
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Although definitions of "product" vary widely among state statuteS52 and
courts,53 this requirement is, with some exceptions,5 4 generally satisfied
without much discussion.55 While a determination of whether a product
conforms to the quality represented is fairly straightforward, difficulty often
arises with regard to the issue of whether a product is defective.56
1. Product Defectiveness
Although some products liability theories of recovery do not require a
showing of defectiveness,57 the concept of "product defect" remains central
to products liability law.s Three categories of defects are recognized:
in this Restatement.
(b) Services, even when provided commercially, are not products.
(c) Human blood and human tissue, even when provided commercially, are not subject
to the rules of this Restatement.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 19 (1998). Unless defined by statute, "it is for the
court to determine as a matter of law whether something is, or is not, a product." Id. cmt. a.
52. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-115 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg.
Sess.) ("[a] tangible article, including attachments, accessories, and component parts, and
accompanying labels, warnings, instructions, and packaging"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71
(West, Westlaw through 2010 File 58 of the 128th GA) ("any object, substance, mixture, or raw
material that constitutes tangible personal property and that satisfies all of the following: [(1)] ...
capable of delivery itself . .. [; (2)] ... produced, manufactured, or supplied for introduction into
trade or commerce[; and (3)] .. . intended for sale or lease to persons for commercial or personal
use"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102 (LEXIS through 2010 Reg. Sess.) ("any tangible object or
goods produced").
53. See, e.g., Pierson v. Sharp Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 264 Cal. Rptr. 673, 676 (Ct. App. 1989) ("A
product is a physical article which results from a manufacturing process and is ultimately delivered
to a consumer."); Wyrulee Co. v. Schutt, 866 P.2d 756, 760 (Wyo. 1993) ("[A] 'product' is anything
made by human industry or art." (quoting Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 523 N.E.2d 835, 838
(Ohio 1988))).
54. See Malcolm Wheeler, The Need for Narrow Tort Reform: Abolishing Strict Product
Liability, in PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM: DEBATING THE ISSUES (Kenneth L. Chilton ed. 1990)
(summarizing court and legislative decisions regarding whether plasma and blood products,
electricity, animals, and buildings are considered "products" subject to strict liability).
55. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (power lathe is a
product); Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 247 N.E.2d 401 (Ill. 1969) (hammer is a
product); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978) (high-lift loader is a product);
Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1987) (motorcycle is a product).
56. See infra notes 57-102 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 135-50 and accompanying text (discussing breach of express warranty and
the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).
58. "We take as a starting point the principle that a manufacturer or distributor of a product is
liable to compensate a person injured by a defective product." OWLES, supra note 46, at 1; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (1998) ("One engaged in the business of selling
or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability
for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.").
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manufacturing defects, design defects, and warning defects." Jurisdictions
utilize different definitions of defectiveness, 60 and the test for defectiveness
varies depending on the type of defect.61  If a product is found to be
defective, liability may be imposed based on several different theories of
liability-negligence, strict liability, and the implied warranty of
merchantability.62 Regardless of which of these bases of liability is applied,
"[i]n order to recover, a plaintiff... must prove that the [product] was
defective and that the defect caused the injury."
i. Manufacturing Defects
Early products liability cases often involved injuries caused by
manufacturing defects. 4 A claim based on a manufacturing defect may be
brought under a negligence, warranty, or strict liability theory of liability.6 s
A product "contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from
its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998); see also John W. Wade, On the
Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 830 (1973) (a "product must be
harmful or unsafe because of something wrong with it. The 'something wrong' may have come
about quite unintentionally because of a miscarriage in the manufacturing process, so that the
product was not what it was intended to be; it may, on the other hand, have come about, even though
the product was exactly as it was intended to be, because of a poor design or the failure to attach a
warning or suitable instructions.").
60. See William C. Powers, Jr., The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEx. L. REV.
777, 783-84 (1983). The dominant approaches for determining defectiveness are the consumer
expectations and risk-utility tests:
Much of the debate concerning the definition of defectiveness has focused on two basic
approaches. One approach, reflecting the warranty heritage of strict products liability,
provides that a product is defective if it is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer." A second approach, reflecting the
tort heritage of strict products liability, provides that a product is defective if it is
"unreasonably dangerous"-that is, it possesses features whose risks outweigh their
benefits. Under this "risk-utility" test, a manufacturer may attempt to justify a product's
risks by referring to the social benefits derived from imposing them.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965)).
61. See id at 782-83 ("Courts have not applied a uniform concept of defectiveness to all types of
defects. Flaws have usually been considered to be per se defective, warnings defects have normally
been judged explicitly by a negligence standard, and design defects have been judged by a variety of
complex standards."); see also I DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 439-40 (3rd ed. 2000) ("Most courts and commentators have come to understand that
meaningful evaluation of the acceptability of a product's dangers logically turns on considerations
that vary contextually depending upon whether the problem was one of manufacture, design, or the
absence of a sufficient warning.").
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 cmt. a (1998).
63. Powers, supra note 60, at 781.
64. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (injury caused by
exploding Coca-Cola bottle due to over pressurization or glass flaw).
65. 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 399-400. "Strict liability, however, is likely to be the most
effective for a plaintiff trying to prove a manufacturing defect case given that it does not require
proof of fault." Id.
1182
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preparation and marketing of the product." 66  Thus, the standard for
identifying manufacturing defects requires a determination of whether the
product varies in a meaningful way from its intended condition.6 Because a
product may depart from its intended design due to an error in the
manufacturing process, which results in a flaw in-or the mis-manufacture
of-the product, a manufacturing defect "may affect only a single product,
or a single lot or batch of the product."68  Accordingly, manufacturing
defects can be contrasted with design defects, which reflect conscious design
decisions and affect an entire product line.69
ii. Design Defects
Design defects exist when a manufacturer should have designed the
product differently to make it safer.70 A product is defectively designed
when:
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative
design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative
design renders the product not reasonably safe.
Unlike manufacturing defects, design defects reflect the manufacturer's
conscious decision to include a particular feature in the product and, when
the product is manufactured as intended, affect the entire product line. 72
Allegations of defective design generally include a proposed reasonable (or
feasible) alternative design, which, if incorporated, would reduce the risk of
injury. 73 Because "the degree of risk or safety in every product design is
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(a) (1998).
67. 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 397. Further, "the manufacturing defect must be such as to
pose an unreasonable risk of harm to the user or consumer." Id. at 400.
68. Id. at 397.
69. See infra notes 70-87 and accompanying text.
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998).
71. Id.
72. 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 397. "For this reason, design defect claims are of greatest
concern to manufacturers, since a judicial declaration that the design of a particular product on trial
is 'defective' condemns the entire product line." Id. at 440.
73. Id. at 463. A reasonable alternative design serves as proof that the plaintiffs injury could
have been prevented or reduced by the alteration of the product's design:
Throughout the twentieth century, the great majority of design defect cases involved
proof by the plaintiff of a feasible alternative design . . . , for example, a commercial
coffee urn which exploded, where the explosion could have been prevented by a simple
1183
necessarily counterbalanced by considerations such as cost, utility, and
aesthetics," 74 optimal safety is the dominant standard in design cases.75
The test for identifying design defects varies by jurisdiction.7 ' All
jurisdictions, however, apply some variation77 of the two primary tests-
consumer expectations or risk-utility.78  A design is defective under the
consumer expectations test "'when it is dangerous to an extent beyond which
would be contemplated by the ordinary user or consumer possessing the
knowledge of the product's characteristics which were common to the
community."' 79  Due to its inherent limitations,80  many courts have
reducing valve; a tractor steering wheel, made of rubber and fiber, that broke in the
driver's hands causing him to fall into the path of the tractor, where a rim made of wood
or metal would not have broken; [and] a vaporizer which overheated and caught fire
when the water boiled away, where the fire could have been prevented by a simple cutoff
device.
Id.
74. Id at 441.
75. Id In design cases, "the goal of design engineers can only be to promote in products an ideal
balance of product usefulness, cost, and safety. A product design, in other words, can only be
optimally, not perfectly, safe." Id. Furthermore,
[a] risk is often justifiable because it is a concommitant [sic] of a socially desirable
feature of a product. The speed of automobiles and the sharpness of knives provide
concommitant [sic] risks and benefits. Sometimes, however, a risk is acceptable because
a product that avoided it would be inordinately expensive. Consequently, courts have
considered product cost to be an appropriate factor in a risk-utility balance. If they
ignored product cost, every product that imposes risks would be defective, because nearly
every product could be made safer at some cost.
Powers, supra note 60, at 792.
76. Compare Hansen v. New Holland N. Am., Inc., 574 N.W.2d 250 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)
(finding consumer expectations to be the appropriate test in deciding whether a hay baler was
defectively designed), with McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1967) (applying
the risk-utility balancing test to find a vaporizer manufacturer negligent in adopting an unsafe
design).
77. Some jurisdictions apply a combination of the consumer expectations and risk-utility tests.
See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978) (providing plaintiffs with the option of
using either basis of liability to establish a design defect); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d
871 (Alaska 1979); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz. 1985); Ontai v. Straub Clinic &
Hosp. Inc., 659 P.2d 734 (Haw. 1983); Lamkin v. Towner, 563 N.E.2d 449 (Ill. 1990). Other
jurisdictions apply a version of the risk-utility test with the addition of constructive knowledge,
known as the Wade-Keeton hindsight test. I OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 494. These
jurisdictions define design defectiveness for strict liability "in terms of whether a manufacturer or
other seller, knowing of its product's dangerous condition (a seller with full knowledge), would be
negligent in selling it in that condition." Id.
78. See I OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 443 ("All courts judge the adequacy of a product's
design upon one of two basic standards, or some variation thereof-(I) by determining whether the
design meets the safety expectations of an ordinary user or consumer, and/or (2) by conducting a
risk-benefit evaluation of whether the foreseeable safety benefits from eliminating a harmful design
or feature exceed the foreseeable safety costs.").
79. Hansen, 574 N.W.2d at 253 (quoting Ransome v. WEPCO, 275 N.W.2d 641, 649 (Wis.
1979)).
80. For example, because the risk of injury from obvious dangers shifts to the consumer under
the consumer expectations test, "the test perniciously rewards manufacturers for failing to adopt
cost-effective measures to remedy obviously unnecessary dangers to human life and limb." I OWEN
1184
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abandoned the consumer expectations test for defective design" in favor of
the predominant risk-utility test, 82 which considers whether "the safety
benefits from eliminating the design danger that harmed the plaintiff were
foreseeably greater than the precaution costs." 83  In other words, the risk-
utility test "requires the balancing of the risks inherent in a product design
against the utility of the product so designed."8 4  Where a design is
otherwise inadequate, it may nonetheless be found not defective where the
danger is obvious,"' the product is state of the art,86 or the plaintiff fails to
propose a reasonable alternative design.87
iii. Warning Defects
Despite being properly manufactured and designed, a product may
nonetheless be defective if it fails to include adequate warnings or
instructions to reduce the risk of harm caused by the product's hazards.88 A
product contains a warning defect when:
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
ET AL., supra note 61, at 447. Furthermore, in complex cases, the consumer expectations test is
difficult to apply because consumers often have only vague expectations. Id. at 447-48.
81. Id. at 445.
82. Id. at 449-51.
83. Id. at 452. "The risk-utility test for establishing design defectiveness is unaffected by
whether the underlying theory of recovery is negligence or strict liability in tort, or possibly even
implied warranty, because the necessary balance between a particular design feature's safety, costs,
and effect on product utility remains the same." Id. at 453-54.
84. Foley v. Clark Equip. Co., 523 A.2d 379, 388 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
85. 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 600-03. The obviousness of a danger affects not only the
question of defectiveness but may also be a factor in determining proximate cause and the
applicability of affirmative defenses, such as assumption of risk, contributory negligence, or
comparative negligence. Id. at 603. Comment I to section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability provides, however, that "obviousness of risk does not necessarily obviate a duty
to provide a safer design. Just as warnings may be ignored, so may obvious or generally known
risks be ignored, leaving a residuum of risk great enough to require adopting a safer design."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. 1 (1998).
86. 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 442. State of the art involves the question of "whether the
means of avoiding the risks, by designing them away, are known or reasonably knowable and
feasible under the existing state of science and technology." Id. at 627.
87. See id. at 465-67 (explaining that some jurisdictions require proof of a reasonable alternative
design to establish a design defect claim).
88. Id. at 511. An adequate warning must "by its size, location and intensity of language or
symbol, . .. be calculated to impress upon a reasonably prudent user the nature and extent of the
hazard involved." Id. at 520.
1185
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the
instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.1
The duty to warn advances two policy objectives: (1) reduction of risks and
accident costs, and (2) informed consent.90 Like the requirement of a
reasonable alternative design for design defects, warning defects require a
showing that a better warning or instruction-a reasonable alternative
warning-could have reasonably made the product safer.9 '
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability addresses the
relationship between design and warning defects:
In general, when a safer design can reasonably be implemented and
risks can reasonably be designed out of a product, adoption of the
safer design is required over a warning that leaves a significant
residuum of such risks. ... However, when an alternative design to
avoid risks cannot reasonably be implemented, adequate
instructions and warnings will normally be sufficient to render the
product reasonably safe.. . . Warnings are not, however, a
substitute for the provision of a reasonably safe design.92
While the inclusion of warnings will not cure a design defect, warnings are
necessary when a product's use creates a risk of likely or severe harm and
that risk is not readily apparent to the user.93  The Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability explains, however, that a product may not be found
defective for failure to warn where the risk of harm is obvious: "The fact
that a risk is obvious or generally known often serves the same function as a
warning." 94
Manufacturers are presumed to possess "the knowledge and skill of an
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(c) (1998).
90. 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 513. The relationship between the duty to warn and the
policy objectives is as follows:
As to risk and accident cost reduction, point of sale warnings as to product hazards and
instructions for reasonably safe use are established mechanisms of hazard and injury
reduction. The latter rationale-informed consent-reflects the societal judgment that a
product user or consumer is entitled to make his own choice as to whether the product's
utility or benefits justify exposing himself or others to the risk of harm.
Id at 513-14.
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 cmt. a (1998).
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. 1(1998).
93. 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 511-12.
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. 1(1998); see also Maneely v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1997) ("At some point, manufacturers must be relieved
of the paternalistic responsibility of warning users of every possible risk that could arise from
foreseeable use of their product. That point comes when ordinary users readily recognize the risk on
their own."); see supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of a danger's
obviousness on the issue of design defectiveness).
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expert."95 In most jurisdictions, sellers are not liable for failing to warn of
risks that are unknown or unknowable when the product is distributed.96
Other jurisdictions, however, impute upon a manufacturer the knowledge of
risks known at the time of trial regardless of whether such risks were known
or knowable at the time of distribution.97
Warning defects may arise in claims based on negligence,98 implied
warranty of merchantability,99 or strict liability in tort"' principles. While
many jurisdictions treat warnings defects the same regardless of the theory
of liability applied, other jurisdictions continue to distinguish between
95. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973). In Borel, the
court held that "[tihe manufacturer's status as expert means that at a minimum he must keep abreast
of scientific knowledge, discoveries, and advances and is presumed to know what is imparted
thereby." Id.
96. 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 517; see, e.g., Fibreboard Corp. v. Pool, 813 S.W.2d 658,
668 (Tex. App. 1991) (in a failure to warn claim, the risk must be "reasonably foreseeable or
scientifically discoverable"). The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability explains that,
"[i]n cases involving a claim of design defect in a mechanical product, foreseeability of risk is rarely
an issue as a practical matter. . . . [P]hysical risks of injury are generally known or reasonably
knowable by experts in the field." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m
(1998). However:
The issue of foreseeability of risk of harm is more complex in the case of products such
as prescription drugs, medical devices, and toxic chemicals. Risks attendant to use and
consumption of these products may, indeed, be unforeseeable at the time of sale.
Unforeseeable risks arising from foreseeable product use or consumption by definition
cannot specifically be warned against.
Id. Two rationales are cited for imposing liability for warning defects only when manufacturers
have actual or constructive knowledge:
One practical reason for the limitation is that it will almost invariably be an exercise in
speculation to warn about risks that are imperceptible. The second is that "if a
manufacturer could not count on limiting its liability to risks that were known or
knowable at the time of manufacture or distribution, it would be discouraged from
developing new and improved products for fear that later significant advances in
scientific knowledge would increase its liability.
1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 518-19 (quoting Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 810
P.2d 549, 556 (Cal. 1991)).
97. See, e.g., In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases, 699 F. Supp. 233 (D. Haw. 1988), aff'd, 960 F.2d
806 (9th Cir. 1992); Dambacher v. Mallis, 485 A.2d 408 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Ayers ex rel. Ayers
v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods. Co., 818 P.2d 1337, 1346 (Wash. 1991).
98. 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 516-17 ("Under negligence principles, a supplier may be
liable for injury or damage for failure to warn adequately when it knows or should know that without
warnings, the product is likely to pose an unreasonable risk of injury or damage, but fails to exercise
reasonable care to inform users of that risk.").
99. Id. at 517 ("In warranty, an inadequate warning may also render a product unsuited for the
ordinary purpose for which it is used, constituting a breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability.").
100. Id. at 516 ("In most jurisdictions, under strict liability, a seller's failure to provide adequate
warnings or instructions may result in liability if such deficiency renders the product 'unreasonably
dangerous."').
1187
failure to warn claims based in negligence and those based in strict
liability.o' For example, in Livingston v. Marie Callender's, Inc., the court
held that:
the fact that a manufacturer acted as a reasonably prudent
manufacturer in deciding not to warn, while perhaps absolving the
manufacturer of liability under the negligence theory, will not
preclude liability under strict liability principles if the trier of fact
concludes that, based on the information scientifically available to
the manufacturer, the manufacturer's failure to warn rendered the
product unsafe to its users.' 02
As such, in a minority of jurisdictions, the plaintiffs theory of recovery may
affect the issue of whether a product contains a warning defect.
2. Theories of Recovery
Where a product causes injury, an injured plaintiff may bring a products
liability claim against appropriate defendants based on several different legal
theories.103  Products liability actions may be based on any combination of
negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability claims. 0
i. Negligence
Since MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 05 first "gave birth to negligence
claims against manufacturers,"to0 negligence actions have occupied a central
role in products liability law. 07  Described as "the classic products liability
101. Idat514-15.
102. Livingston v. Marie Callender's, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528, 532 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting
Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 559 (Cal. 1991)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
103. 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 16.
104. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
105. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). In MacPherson, the wooden wheel spokes broke on a Buick-
manufactured automobile, causing the wheel's collapse and the plaintiffs injury. Id. at 1051. In
holding Buick liable despite a lack of privity, New York's highest court concluded that "the
manufacturer of [a] thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully." Id at 1053.
106. OWEN, supra note 30, at 23.
107. 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 43. Negligence was the standard theory of recovery in
early products liability actions. Id. Even after strict liability in tort emerged as a popular cause of
action, negligence has retained its central position. Id. Negligence principles remain especially
relevant to products liability actions in those states that do not recognize strict liability in tort,
including Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia. See Joseph v.
Jamesway Corp., 1997 WL 524126 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997); Commonwealth v. Johnson Insulation,
682 N.E.2d 1323 (Mass. 1997); Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 557 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. 1997), abrogated
on other grounds by Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002); Bryant v. Adams, 448
S.E.2d 832 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605 (Va. 1992).
1188
[Vol. 38: 1175, 2011] Putting the "Product" in Reproduction
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
claim,"1 o8 negligence actions require a plaintiff to show that (1) the seller
owed the plaintiff a duty of due care, (2) the seller breached that duty by
furnishing a defectivel" product, and (3) the seller's breach caused the
plaintiffs injury." 0 The seller's duty to provide safe products applies to a
product's manufacture,"' design,"l 2  and inclusion of warnings and
instructions,"' and it is described as a "duty to exercise reasonable care to
prevent unreasonable risks of injury from the products they sell."ll 4
Because a seller's duty under negligence is one of reasonableness,"' the fact
that a product is defective will not in itself establish a breach"'6 :
108. 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 43.
109. The product may contain a manufacturing defect, design defect, or warning defect. Id. at 44.
110. Seeidat43-44.
111. The exercise of due care in the manufacturing context:
requires the manufacturer to exercise reasonable care in the production of the product.
This duty requires the manufacturer to exercise reasonable care at two distinct stages of
the manufacturing process prior to distribution of the product: (1) during the actual
process of manufacturing the product, including the selection, inspection, and assembly
of raw materials and component parts; and (2) after production, in the process of quality
control ("quality assurance") designed to limit the output of defective products to the
smallest reasonable level.
Id. at 45.
112. The exercise of due care in the design context:
requires that the manufacturer exercise reasonable care in a variety of different functions:
that the general product concept be conceived and formulated carefully for its reasonable
uses and abuses; that proper attention be devoted to selecting appropriate materials and
components to be assembled together into the finished product; that safety devices for the
product's expected uses be adopted as appropriate; and that prototypes of the product be
tested, as appropriate, in contexts duplicating the harshest circumstances of expected use.
Id at 44-45.
113. To satisfy the requirement of due care in the warnings context, "manufacturers must exercise
reasonable care to instruct consumers on how to use such products safely and to warn them of
hidden dangers that the products may contain." Id. at 45-46.
114. Id. at 44.
115. See id. at 46 ("[Tlhe duty under negligence law is limited to reasonable care-not perfect
care; to protecting only persons foreseeably placed at risk-not all persons; and to avoid only risks
that are foreseeable-not all risks."). Reasonable care is determined by weighing the cost of
preventing an injury against the risk of harm: "If the risk posed by the sale and use of a product in a
certain condition is great, due care therefore requires that great precautions be taken to avert the risk;
if the risk is small, reasonable care requires only small precautionary measures in response." Id. at
55. Judge Learned Hand explained this concept in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d
169 (2d Cir. 1947), with the following algebraic formula: B < P x L 4 N. Id. at 173. This formula
stands for the proposition that a party is negligent (N) if the burden or cost of preventing harm (B) is
less than the product of the probability of harm (P) and the likely magnitude of harm (L). Id.
116. "Even the most careful manufacturers who follow all tenets of good manufacturing practices
sometimes produce products that are defective." I OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 46. For instance,
even if a manufacturer could have identified risks through additional testing and altered the
product's design to reduce those risks, the manufacturer may not be negligent for defective design if
the decision to forego additional testing was reasonable:
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[T]he plaintiff in a negligence case generally must prove both defect
and negligence: that is, (1) that the product was defective (in its
design, manufacture, or marketing), and (2) that the manufacturer
was negligent in some manner in allowing the product to be
manufactured and sold in a defective condition."'
Because the plaintiff must show that a defendant-seller acted unreasonably,
negligence-unlike the implied warranty of merchantability' 18 and strict
liability in tort"'-does not extend liability to all parties in the chain of
distribution without a showing of individualized fault. 120
ii. Breach of Warranty
Breach of warranty claims are contract-based causes of action involving
the sale of goods.121 Without regard to fault, sellers are strictly liable for any
breach of warranty due to the "presumed voluntary nature of the
contract." 22  Warranties may be either expressl23 or implied. 124 The
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) recognizes two types of implied
warranties which are, unless excluded by specific language, read into
agreements for the sale of goods: the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purposel 25  and the implied warranty of merchantability.126
Almost any risk is foreseeable if a product is tested sufficiently. But the issue in
negligence is whether a risk is reasonably foreseeable, an issue that depends on the
reasonableness of the decision to forego further testing. If a reasonably prudent person
would believe that additional research would not be cost-effective, a decision to forego
the research would be reasonable, and the risks it would have disclosed would not have
been reasonably foreseeable. Risks that are not reasonably foreseeable do not count
against a manufacturer in a cost-benefit analysis to determine negligence.
Powers, supra note 60, at 792-93.
117. 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 46.
118. See infra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 173-92 and accompanying text.
120. Negligence will only impose liability on a party that acted unreasonably-which is typically
the manufacturer, because a distributor or retailer is generally not involved in the product's
manufacture, design, or inclusion of warnings and instructions. See OWEN, supra note 30, at 29-30.
121. Under the UCC, "goods" are defined as:
all things that are movable at the time of identification to a contract for sale. The term
includes future goods, specially manufactured goods, the unborn young of animals,
growing crops, and other identified things attached to realty as described in Section 2-
107. The term does not include information, the money in which the price is to be paid,
investment securities under Article 8, the subject matter of foreign exchange transactions,
or choses in action.
U.C.C. § 2-103 (2004).
122. NOEL & PHILLIPS, supra note 33, at 35.
123. See infra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 143-62 and accompanying text.
125. See U.C.C. § 2-315 (2004).
126. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (2004).
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Although breach of warranty has its origin in tort rather than in contract,127 it
has been embraced by the UCC as an integral part of contract law.128
Products liability's relaxation of warranty's privity requirement 29 has
led some scholars to question whether "warranty without privity is really
warranty at all in its contractual sense."l 30 Although a contractual
relationship is generally recognized as an essential element of a breach of
warranty claim, products liability has both eliminated barriers to suing
various parties in the chain of distribution' 3' and has expanded the ability of
non-purchasersl32 to recover in warranty for injuries caused by a product. 33
Because the relaxation of the horizontal privity requirement varies broadly
by jurisdiction, the UCC recognizes three alternatives for extending both
express and implied warranty protection to non-purchasers.13 4
127. William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117,
118 (1943) ("In its inception, breach of warranty was a tort."); see also NOEL & PHILLIPS, supra note
33, at 33.
128. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to 2-315 (2004); see also NOEL & PHILLIPS, supra note 33, at 34
("American courts . . . attribute[d) a contractual nature to implied warranty and therefore an
association with privity.").
129. See OWEN, supra note 30, at 23-24 ("Truly modem products liability law in America began
in 1960 with Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors which allowed a non-purchaser injured in an accident
caused by a defective automobile to maintain a breach of warranty action against the manufacturer
despite the absence of privity of contract and notwithstanding a contractual disclaimer that barred
such claims."); see also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
130. NOEL & PHILLIPS, supra note 33, at 34 (citing W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 656-58 (4th
ed. 1971); Thomas A. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077,
1080 (1965).
131. This is commonly known as "vertical privity." I OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 163.
132. This is commonly known as "horizontal privity." Id.
133. See generally id. at 162-77.
134. The provision provides:
Alternative A to subsection 2:
A seller's warranty to an immediate buyer, whether express or implied, a seller's
remedial promise to an immediate buyer, or a seller's obligation to a remote purchaser
under Section 2-313A or 2-313B extends to any individual who is in the family or
household of the immediate buyer or the remote purchaser or who is a guest in the
home of either if it is reasonable to expect that the person may use, consume, or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty, remedial
promise, or obligation. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B to subsection 2:
A seller's warranty to an immediate buyer, whether express or implied, a seller's
remedial promise to an immediate buyer, or a seller's obligation to a remote purchaser
under Section 2-313A or 2-313B extends to any individual who may reasonably be
expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty, remedial promise, or obligation. A seller may not exclude or
limit the operation of this section.
Alternative C to subsection 2:
A seller's warranty to an immediate buyer, whether express or implied, a seller's
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a. Express Warranties
Express warranties are statements made by a seller and relied upon by a
buyer as part of a sales agreement.'15  The creation of express warranties is
governed by UCC section 2-313.16 Express warranties can be created by
both merchants and non-merchants137 through written or oral statements,
images, packaging, or samples,' 38 and the seller need not use the word
"warranty" or even intend to give a warranty.139  Any attempt to exclude
warranties is void to the extent that the attempted exclusion is inconsistent
with an express warranty. 40
To establish a breach of an express warranty, a plaintiff must show that
remedial promise to an immediate buyer, or a seller's obligation to a remote purchaser
under Section 2-313A or 2-313B extends to any person that may reasonably be
expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and that is injured by breach of
the warranty, remedial promise, or obligation. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom
the warranty, remedial promise, or obligation extends.
U.C.C. § 2-318 (2004).
135. U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (2004).
136. The provision states:
(2) Express warranties by the seller to the immediate buyer are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller which relates to the goods
and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model that is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or
model.
(3) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal
words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that the seller have a specific intention to
make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement
purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not
create a warranty.
(4) Any remedial promise made by the seller to the immediate buyer creates an
obligation that the promise will be performed upon the happening of the specified
event.
U.C.C. § 2-313 (2004).
137. 1 OWEN ETAL., supra note 61, at 128.
138. U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (2004); see also PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3:3
(Sol Schreiber & Paul D. Rheingold eds. 1967) ("Oral statements by sellers, labels, containers,
photographs, and advertising copy all attest to the advantages of a particular product. They are also
sources of express warranties.").
139. U.C.C. § 2-313(3) (2004).
140. See U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (2004). For example, in Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc., 322 A.2d
440 (N.J. 1974), a used car salesman wrote "30 day warranty" on the front of plaintiffs purchase
agreement, but he included a printed clause on the back of the agreement that provided, "It is
expressly agreed that there are no warranties, express or implied, made by either the selling dealer or
the manufacturer ..... Id at 442 & n.2. Six days after the purchase, the plaintiff was injured by the
malfunction of the vehicle's carburetor linkage. Id. at 442. The court held that the disclaimer was
inoperative to exclude the express thirty-day warranty. Id. at 442 n.2.
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(1) the seller made a factual assertion or promise which constitutes an
express warranty, (2) the assertion was a basis of the bargain, (3) the
assertion was false, and (4) the falsity of the assertion caused harm to the
plaintiff. 141 Because liability for breach of an express warranty does not
require a defect, express warranties "impose a form of 'strict' liability upon
the seller which requires no showing of fault."l 42
b. Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purposel43
The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is an implied
promise by the seller that the product is suitable for the buyer's special
purpose.'" To establish a breach of the fitness warranty, a plaintiff must
show that (1) the seller had knowledge of the buyer's particular purpose, (2)
the buyer relied on the seller's skill and judgment, (3) the product was not fit
for the buyer's particular purpose, and (4) the unfitness of the product for the
buyer's purpose caused harm to the plaintiff. 145
Although it does not require a defect,14 6 the fitness warranty demands
that the seller be aware of the buyer's special purpose. 14 Accordingly, it
usually "arises from a one-on-one dealing between the buyer and the seller
calculated to create quite explicit expectations in the buyer as to the
product's ability to accomplish his or her particular task." 48  In contrast
with the implied warranty of merchantability,149 the fitness warranty arises
when a buyer purchases a product for a special, rather than ordinary,
purpose. 50
141. 1 OWEN ETAL., supra note 61, at 127-28.
142. Id. at 127.
143. U.C.C. § 2-315 (2004).
144. The provision states:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for
which the goods area required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under
the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purposes.
Id.
145. Id
146. 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 162 ("Provided the conditions exist which give rise to the
warranty, it may be breached when a product properly made and merchantable is simply the wrong
one for the buyer's particular use.").
147. U.C.C. § 2-315 (2004).
148. 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 154.
149. See infra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
150. 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 154-55. The distinction between a particular purpose and
an ordinary purpose is explained as follows:
A "particular purpose" differs from the ordinary purpose for which the goods are used in
that it envisages a specific use by the buyer which is peculiar to the nature of his business
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c. Implied Warranty of Merchantability"'
The implied warranty of merchantabilityl5 2  is read into a sales
agreement without regard to the parties' intentions, arising "merely because
the goods have been sold at all."' 53 The underlying policy behind the
implied warranty of merchantability is the promotion of fair dealing in sales
agreements. 5 4 One primary justification for imposing an implied warranty
on sellers is the belief that the responsibility for defective goods "is best
placed upon the seller as a cost of his business, which he may distribute to
the public at large as part of the price."iss
To establish a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, the
plaintiff must show that (1) the seller is a merchant,156 (2) the product was
whereas the ordinary purposes for which goods are used are those envisaged in the
concept of merchantability and go to uses which are customarily made of the goods in
question. For example, shoes are generally used for the purpose of walking upon
ordinary ground, but a seller may know that a particular pair was selected to be used for
climbing mountains.
U.C.C. § 2-315 cmt. 2 (2004).
151. U.C.C. § 2-314 (2004).
152. The provision states:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or
drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description;
and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and
quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require;
and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if
any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may arise
from course of dealing or usage of trade.
Id.
153. Prosser, The Implied Warranty ofMerchantable Quality, supra note 127, at 124.
154. J.W. Looney, Warranties in Livestock, Feed, Seed, and Pesticide Transactions, 25 U. MEM.
L. REv. 1123, 1127 (1995).
155. Prosser, The Implied Warranty ofMerchantable Quality, supra note 127, at 122.
156. A "merchant" is defined as:
a person that deals in goods of the kind or otherwise holds itself out by occupation as
having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or
to which the knowledge or skill may be attributed by the person's employment of an
agent or broker or other intermediary that holds itself out by occupation as having the
knowledge or skill.
U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2004). Thus, the implied warranty of merchantability "does not apply to isolated
sales made by persons not fitting that description, 'isolated sales' being such as occur only once or
very infrequently in the course of the seller's ordinary business." I OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at
144.
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unmerchantable' 57-or defective15 -at the time of sale, and (3) the
unmerchantable condition of the product caused the plaintiffs injury.'
The implied warranty of merchantability applies to all merchants in the
chain of distribution'" without regard to fault.'16  It does not, however,
apply to "open and obvious" product defects.162
d. Exclusion & Modification of Warranties' 63
UCC section 2-316 governs the exclusion or modification of
warranties.'" Although attempts to exclude warranties are inoperable to the
157. A product is unmerchantable when it is not fit for its ordinary purpose. See McCabe v. L. K.
Liggett Drug Co., 112 N.E.2d 254, 256 (Mass. 1953) ("Merchantable quality means that goods are
reasonably suitable for the ordinary uses for which goods of that description are sold.").
158. Again, the defect may arise due to deficiencies in the product's manufacture, design, or
warnings. I OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 142-43.
159. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (2004).
160. See 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 144 ("The implied warranty of merchantability runs
with all such goods sold. . .
161. Id. at 141.
162. See U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b) (2004) ("[W]hen the buyer before entering into the contract has
examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the
goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the
circumstances to have revealed to him").
163. U.C.C. § 2-316 (2004).
164. The provision states:
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or
conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable
as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or
extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent
that such construction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in
case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied
warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to
exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that
"There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded
by expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or other language which in common
understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and
makes plain that there is no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the
sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there
is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the
circumstances to have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of dealing or
course of performance or usage of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the provisions of
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extent that such attempts are inconsistent with express warranties, 165 implied
warranties can generally be excluded if certain conditions are met.'6 The
implied warranty of merchantability can be disclaimed orally or in writing,
provided that the seller uses the word "merchantability," and such a
disclaimer must be conspicuous only if in writing. 16 7 The exclusion of the
fitness warranty, in contrast, which was likely created as part of the sale,'68
must be in writing and conspicuous but need not mention "implied warranty
for a particular purpose."' 69 Despite these requirements, implied warranties
are excluded when the seller provides language conveying that the good is
being sold "as is," the buyer has had the opportunity to examine the goods
for apparent defects, or the implied warranty has been altered by the parties
by course of dealing, course of performance, or trade usage.o70  The
limitation of breach of warranty remedies is permitted by UCC section 2-
316(4) and is addressed in UCC sections 2-718'' and 2-719.172
iii. Strict Liability in Tort
Three years after New Jersey's Henningsen decision, 73 California's
Supreme Court decided Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 74 in
which Justice Roger Traynor established the new doctrine of strict liability
in tort, stating that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article
this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages and on contractual modification
of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719).
Id.
165. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
166. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (2004).
167. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2004).
168. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
169. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2004).
170. U.C.C. § 2-316(3) (2004).
171. UCC section 2-718 discusses the liquidation or limitation of damages. U.C.C. § 2-718
(2004).
172. UCC section 2-719 discusses contractual modifications or limitations of remedies. U.C.C. §
2-719 (2004). UCC section 2-719(3) addresses consequential damages and provides that such
damages "may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.
Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima
facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not." U.C.C. § 2-
719(3) (2004).
173. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
174. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). In Greenman, the plaintiff was injured by a combination power
tool purchased for him by his wife. Id. at 898. Relying on the plaintiffs evidence that his injuries
were caused by the power tool's defective manufacture and design, the jury returned a $65,000
verdict for the plaintiff. Id at 899. In upholding the trial court's ruling, Justice Traynor held that:
[t]o establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was
injured while using the Shopsmith in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a
defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that made the
Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use.
Id. at 901.
1196
[Vol. 38: 1175, 2011] Putting the "Product" in Reproduction
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." 75
Prior to Greenman, "actions for injuries caused by defective products had
been based either on breach of warranty or on negligence; after 1963, a
plaintiff had the additional choice of basing his action under the new theory
of strict liability in tort."' 7 1 Shortly after Greenman was decided, the
American Law Institute adopted the rule of strict liability in tort in section
402A' of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which "marked the first
recognition by the [American Law Institute] of privity-free strict liability for
sellers of defective products."' 78  Many other jurisdictions soon followed
California's lead in adopting the doctrine. 79
Strict liability in tort is "strict" in that it does not require a showing of
175. Id. at 900. Justice Traynor expressly recognized the limitations of warranty, explaining that
although previous cases imposing strict liability on manufacturers were generally based on
contractual warranties:
the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the
liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law, and the refusal to permit the
manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products make
clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law
of strict liability in tort....
. . . The purpose of [strict liability in tort] is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the
market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves. Sales
warranties serve this purpose fitfully at best.
Id. at 901 (citations omitted).
176. OWLES,supra note 46, at 37.
177. Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
178. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB., Introduction (1998) ("The major thrust of
§ 402A was to eliminate privity so that a user or consumer, without having to establish negligence,
could bring an action against a manufacturer, as well as against any other member of a distributive
chain that had sold a product containing a manufacturing defect.").
179. With Wyoming's adoption of strict liability in tort in Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716
P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986), the doctrine has been accepted by forty-five states, as well as the District of
Columbia and the Virgin Islands. See 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 274-75. Five jurisdictions
still do not recognize the doctrine. See supra note 107.
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any fault on the part of the seller.'80 There are two primary justifications for
subjecting sellers to strict liability in tort: first, to compensate consumers for
injuries caused by defective products through "risk-spreading," and second,
to deter the production of unsafe products.'"" To bring a claim in strict
liability in tort, the plaintiff must establish that (1) the seller is regularly
engaged in sales of products of that kind, (2) the product was in a
defectivel 82 condition and unreasonably dangerous, (3) there was no
causative change in the condition in which the product was sold, and (4) the
defective condition of the product caused the plaintiffs injury.183  Like the
implied warranty of merchantability, 184 strict liability in tort applies to all
sellers in a product's chain of distribution,'" although it does not apply to
occasional sellers.186  Further, strict liability in tort does not require privity
between a seller and the product's ultimate consumer.187
The standard for establishing product defectiveness in strict liability in
tort varies depending on the jurisdiction and whether the alleged defect
involves the product's manufacture, design, or warnings.'88  Recognizing
that section 402A, which was established to address manufacturing
defects,'8 1 is inappropriate for claims involving design and warning
defects,' 90 the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability has adopted a
180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965).
181. Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 41, at 430-31.
182. See Gilmore, supra note 36, at 108 ("[N]o court has ('so far') imposed truly strict liability-
that is, allowed recovery where all that the injured plaintiff proved was that his injury resulted from
his use of the goods. . . . [C]ourts have insisted that the plaintiff prove, additionally, that the goods,
whose use caused the injury, were, in some sense, 'defective."').
183. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (1965). The plaintiff's injury must be one
that is recoverable under strict liability. For example, "intangible commercial loss or pure economic
loss is ordinarily not recoverable in strict liability but is normally considered under the provisions of
the UCC rules governing commercial transactions." Looney, supra note 154, at 1133.
184. See supra notes 160-61.
185. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(b) (1965).
186. 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 267-68.
187. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(b) (1965). Before the adoption of strict
liability in tort, the requirement of privity in the products field had been criticized for failing to
protect foreseeable users of a product beyond the purchaser and resulting in:
such utterly preposterous decisions as those holding that the wife who buys the sausage,
handles it, cooks it, eats it, and is poisoned by it, cannot recover because she was merely
buying as the agent of her husband, who was to pay the bill and so is regarded as the
contracting party; whereas the husband, who never saw the food, can recover on a
warranty for the loss of her services.
William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099, 1118 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel].
188. 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 293-94; see also supra notes 57-102 and accompanying
text.
189. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LiAB. § I cmt. a (1998).
190. Because of the negligence principles inherent in a risk-utility analysis of design or warning
defect, section 402A has been criticized for its blanket application of strict liability in tort to all
variations of defect:
The American Law Institute gave birth to . . . analytic confusion with the highly
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general rule of liability for sellers of defective products."' The Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability ignores the traditional significance
attached to the theory of liability and instead defines liability based entirely
on the type of defect. 192
influential section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states that strict
liability applies equally well to cases involving manufacturing defects, design defects,
and failures to warn. Strict liability can be applied coherently in manufacturing defect
cases because a product's defectiveness can be determined without resort to negligence-
oriented cost-benefit balancing. But in both defective-design and failure-to-warn cases,
cost-benefit balancing is inevitably required to determine product defectiveness. Because
cost-benefit balancing is also at the heart of negligence, it is no easy matter in design and
warning cases to discover a difference between strict liability and negligence.
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty
Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 271-72 (1990). Some courts have outright
recognized the doctrine's relationship to negligence where the risk-utility standard is used to
determine whether there is a defect under strict liability in tort involving design or warning defects.
See, e.g., Crislip v. TCH Liquidating Co., 556 N.E.2d 1177, 1183 (Ohio 1990) ("[T]he standard
imposed upon the defendant in a strict liability claim grounded upon an inadequate warning is the
same as that imposed in a negligence claim based upon inadequate warning."); see also Olson v.
Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994) ("[Any posited distinction between strict liability
and negligence principles is illusory.").
191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1(1998) ("One engaged in the business of
selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to
liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.").
192. See id cmt. a. The Restatement (Third) suggests that, "[a]s long as [the] functional criteria
[for defect] are met, courts may utilize the terminology of negligence, strict liability, or the implied
warranty of merchantability, or simply define liability in the terms set forth in the black letter." Id
The functional criteria for defect, as provided in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
section 2, are as follows:
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a
manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate
instructions or warnings. A product:
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended
design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and
marketing of the product;
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative
design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial
chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe;
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and





Various defenses, based on the plaintiffs conduct, are available to a
defendant in a products liability action.'93 Comparative fault principles may
justify the outright denial of a claim or the reduction of damages where a
plaintiff voluntarily assumes a risk, causes or contributes to the injury, or
misuses a product.194
The assumption of risk defense is based on the notion that a plaintiff has
consented to encounter a risk, and it completely bars a plaintiffs claim.'95
Assumption of risk requires both that the plaintiff subjectively appreciate the
risk and voluntarily encounter it because "a person cannot 'consent' to what
he does not know nor what is forced upon him." 96 Whether these elements
are satisfied is generally a question of fact for a jury.'97
Contributory 98 or comparative' 99 negligence may be available as a
defense when the plaintiffs conduct "falls below the standard of reasonable
behavior required for a person's own protection which proximately
contributes . .. to cause the person's harm."200 Although some jurisdictions
do not recognize this defense in claims brought in strict liability in tort, it is
widely available in negligence claims.20' Like assumption of risk, whether
the plaintiff contributed to the harm is often a question of fact for a jury,
although the court may rule on the issue as a matter of law if the plaintiffs
action is undoubtedly reasonable or unreasonable.202
The rationale behind the misuse defense is that "products are necessarily
designed to do certain limited tasks, within certain limited environments of
use, and that no product can be made safe for every purpose, manner, or
extent of use."203 As such, unforeseeable misuse of a product may
completely bar a plaintiffs claim.20 Sellers remain liable, however, for
reasonably foreseeable misuse of a product.205 The question of
foreseeability of misuse is generally a question of fact for a jury.206 The
193. 2 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3 (3rd ed. 2000).
194. Id
195. See id. at 26-27 ("By the act of incurring the risk, the user thus implicitly agrees to take
responsibility for any harmful consequences that may result from the encounter and so relieves the
person who created the risk from responsibility.").
196. Id at 27-28.
197. Id. at 28.
198. Contributory negligence acts as a total bar to a plaintiff's claim. Id. at 3.
199. Comparative negligence reduces a plaintiffs damages in proportion to the plaintiff's fault.
Id.
200. Id. at 10.
201. Id
202. Id. at 12.
203. Id. at 51.
204. Id. at 49-50.
205. Id. at 51-52.
206. Id at 58.
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failure to heed a product's warnings or to follow its instructions is another
form of product misuse which may bar a plaintiff's claim.207
B. Who's Your Daddy? The Evolution ofArtificial Insemination in the
United States
Artificial insemination 208 has been utilized for more than two centuries
as an alternative to sexual intercourse as a means of achieving conception.209
Various insemination methods are used, 210  and there are two broad
categories of artificial insemination: (1) artificial insemination by husband
(AIH), in which a recipient's husband provides the sperm; and (2) artificial
insemination by donor (AID), in which the sperm is provided by a male
other than a recipient's husband.211 In the AID context, the donor may be
either known or anonymous.212
Since its first reported use in 1884,213 AID has gradually gained
207. This position is adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts: "Where warning is given, the
seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning,
which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j.
208. See supra note 4.
209. The first documented case of successful human artificial insemination occurred in the late
eighteenth century in Britain using the recipient's husband's sperm. See Megan D. McIntyre,
Comment, The Potential for Products Liability Actions When Artificial Insemination by an
Anonymous Donor Produces Children with Genetic Defects, 98 DICK. L. REV. 519, 519 n.l (1994)
(citing DOUGLAS J. CUSINE, NEw REPRODUCTIVE TECH4NOLOGIES: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 12, 13
(1988)). The first recorded case in the United States occurred nearly one century later in 1866.
Karen M. Ginsberg, Comment, FDA Approved? A Critique of the Artificial Insemination Industry in
the United States, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 823, 826 (1997).
210. Standard vaginal insemination, for example, occurs when "a woman inserts semen into her
vagina where the sperm swims into her cervix, uterus, and finally to the fallopian tubes to meet an
ovum for fertilization." Swink & Reich, supra note 4, at 860 n.14. Intrauterine insemination, a
more efficient method, occurs when "fresh semen is placed in a centrifuge where the sperm are
'washed,' extracted from the semen, and inserted directly into a woman's uterus via a long, sterile
catheter syringe." Id.
211. Id. at 860-61.
212. Id. at 861.
213. Erica Haimes & Ken Daniels, International Social Science Perspectives on Donor
Insemination: An Introduction, in DONOR INSEMINATION: INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE
PERSPECTIVES I (Ken Daniels & Erica Haimes eds. 1998). The event was first described in a 1909
Medical World article, which was met with reactions "rang[ing] from outrage to applause." ELAINE
TYLER MAY, BARREN IN THE PROMISED LAND: CHILDLESS AMERICANS AND THE PURSUIT OF
HAPPINESS 67 (1997). The article reported that, upon discovering that the recipient's husband had
no sperm in his semen, the treating physician anesthetized the recipient and inserted a semen sample
from "the 'best-looking member of [his medical] class' into her uterus via a rubber syringe. Id. at
65-66. When the woman achieved pregnancy, the doctor told the recipient's husband about the
procedure, although the recipient was never informed of the method of conception. Id. at 66.
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acceptance and popularity as a reproductive method.214 Due to unresolved
moral and legal questions,2 15 the early use of AID to treat male infertility
was an intensely private matter, kept secret for the protection of all parties:
When doctors placed the semen in the recipient they took the risk of
creating a pregnancy outside of marriage. Secrecy thus benefited
the physician, the woman receiving the sperm, any child born as a
result of the procedure (who were called "artificial bastards" by
some critics) and the husband whose infertility needed to be masked
from public view. ... [M]ost [practitioners] preferred donors
unknown to the couple in order to avoid emotional complications.216
Initially considered a response to male infertility, AID later received
attention as a means of preventing the transmission of inherited conditions
following "[tihe development of screening tests to identify carriers of
particular traits."217 By the middle of the twentieth century, doctors
continued to select donors and dictate which couples were eligible for the
administration of AID.2 18 With the development of new technologies
permitting the cryopreservation of sperm, however, "[t]he power to select
donors increasingly rested not with the paternalistic physician but with the
consumer who handed over the credit card to pay for the product." 2 19 The
establishment of sperm banks became possible in 1953, after two
reproductive physicians claimed to have facilitated the birth of four children
using frozen semen.220
With the availability of cryopreservation technologies, the U.S. sperm
banking industry grew rapidly: estimates indicate that there were 10 sperm
banks in operation in 1969,221 16 in 1973,222 and 135 by 1989.223 Although
many physicians continued to rely on fresh semen, the safety of their
214. Jenna H. Bauman, Note, Discovering Donors: Legal Rights to Access Information About
Anonymous Sperm Donors Given to Children ofArtificial Insemination in Johnson v. Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, 31 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 193, 196 (2001).
215. See Cynthia R. Daniels & Janet Golden, Procreative Compounds: Popular Eugenics,
Artificial Insemination and the Rise ofthe American Sperm Banking Industry, 38 J. Soc. HISTORY 5,
12 (2004) (discussing the legal and moral issues associated with the early use of artificial
insemination).
216. Id. at 9.
217. Id at 11. Screening "refers to specific historical factors that place an individual at high risk
for a given disease," while testing "refers to specific laboratory studies." Practice Committee of the
American Society for Reproductive Medicine and the Practice Committee of the Society for Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 2008 Guidelines for Gamete and Embryo Donation: A Practice
Committee Report, 90 FERTILITY & STERILITY S30, S30 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 Guidelines].
218. Daniels & Golden, supra note 215, at 12.
219. Id. at 12.
220. Id. at 13.
221. Id at 16.
222. Id. at 25 n.59.
223. Id at 25 n.60.
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preference was questioned after its use "resulted in a reported six cases of
HIV infection in the United States between 1986 and 1989."224 Because it
could be preserved "until donors tested clean for HIV as well as other
infectious diseases," 2 5 demand for frozen sperm continued to grow. 2 26
By the early 1990s, the artificial insemination industry yielded $164
million annually.227 As the expense of donor recruitment and screening
pushed small operations out of the market, the sperm banking industry
became increasingly corporate and concentrated between 1995 and 2001.228
Sperm banks began shipping specimens nationally, advertising their services
to "non-traditional families and lesbian couples," and even offering "genius
sperm." 22 9 But "while sperm banking services grew, the industry remained
unregulated and unorganized." 23 0
Today, AID is used by heterosexual couples, 2 3 1 lesbian couples, 232 and
unmarried women, and it results in approximately 30,000 births
annually. 234  Through AID, any resulting offspring may be both the
224. Id at 16.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Ginsberg, supra note 209, at 826.
228. Daniels & Golden, supra note 215, at 16. "By 2001, only 28 sperm banks (defined as
facilities which collect, store and offer sperm for sale) were operating in the U.S., based on
information collected from the Sperm Bank Directory, the American Association of Tissue Banks,
the Association for Reproductive Medicine, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)." Id. at
17.
229. Id. at 17.
230. Id. at 16.
231. A study analyzing data from the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth reported that "[a]
total of 7.5% [3.3-4.7 million] of all sexually experienced men reported a visit for help with having
a child at some time during their lifetime." John E. Anderson et al., Infertility Services Reported by
Men in the United States: National Survey Data, 91 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2466, 2467 (2009). Of
these men, "18.1% [725,000 men] reported clinician-diagnosed male-related infertility problems."
Id. Other heterosexual couples choose AID because the man "has a known genetic disease or defect
that he does not wish to pass on to his child." Bauman, supra note 214, at 194.
232. Swink & Reich, supra note 4, at 867.
233. Id. at 865-67. Due to increased self-sufficiency and shifting societal perceptions of family:
[A] growing population of single women are now having children "by choice." This
group is primarily comprised of non-married, career, heterosexual women and once-
married, now-divorced, heterosexual women for whom childbearing was a lesser priority
in earlier years.... Single women are increasingly open to the idea of having children
without being married, and they are purchasing sperm for that purpose.
Id at 865-67 (footnotes omitted).
234. Bauman, supra note 214, at 196; see also Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the
Line-or the Curtain?-for Reproductive Technology, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 59, 61 (2009)
[hereinafter Cahn, Accidental Incest]. But see Andrea Mechanick Braverman, How the Internet is
Reshaping Assisted Reproduction: From Donor Offspring Registries to Direct-to-Consumer Genetic
Testing, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 477, 479 (2010) (stating that "advances in male factor fertility
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biological child of the woman impregnated and, if she is married, the legal
child of her spouse.235 Observers remain concerned, however, that the use
of AID "has progressed with minimal regulation and a great emphasis upon
secrecy. ,236
The artificial insemination industry has undergone a rapid
transformation "from doctor-dominated AID practiced from the 1920s
through the 1960s through the rise of the modern cryobanking industry
which supported a consumer-dominated AID in the late twentieth
century." 237 Currently, in the United States, "tens of thousands of children
are conceived each year through artificial insemination with semen
purchased from sperm banks" 23 8-and yet the field remains largely
unregulated. 2 39  Having grown into a multi-million dollar industry in the
treatment alone have generated significant challenges to the accuracy of that number.").
235. Bauman, supra note 214, at 197. Thirty-four states statutorily determine the legal parentage
of offspring produced through artificial insemination. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-201 (West, Westlaw
through 2010 legislation); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-501 (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-
10-201 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Fiscal Sess.); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West, Westlaw
through 2010 legislation); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg.
Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-774 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Feb. Reg. Sess.); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (West,
Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5405 (West, Westlaw through 2010
Reg. Sess.); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1 to 40/3 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-129 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., EST. &
TRUSTS § 1-206 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46 § 4b (West,
Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2824 (West, Westlaw through
2010 Reg. Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 2008); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (West
2008); MONT. CODE ANN. §40-6-106 (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation); NEV. REV. STAT. §
126.061 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §168-B:3 (West, Westlaw
through 2010 Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73
(McKinney, Westlaw through 2010 legislation); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (West, Westlaw through
2010 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-60 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.88 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §
551 (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.239 (West, Westlaw through
2010 Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.); TEx.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.703 (Vernon 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (West, Westlaw through 2010
Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.705 (West, Westlaw through 2011 laws chapters 1 &
2); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West, Westlaw through 2004 Act 406); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-
901 to 14-2-907 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Budget Sess.).
236. Shelf, supra note 16, at 1048.
237. Daniels & Golden, supra note 215, at 6. This shift can be attributed to a number of factors:
"The development of other, more advanced techniques for assisted reproduction, changes in popular
ideas about families and family formation, the rise of feminism, and challenges to the cultural
authority of medicine pushed decision-making about AID out of the hands of doctors and made it a
consumer-driven process." Id. at 7.
238. Id. at 5.
239. See Swink & Reich, supra note 4, at 870 ("[T]here is a shocking absence of federal laws
regulating sperm banks and artificial insemination practitioners."); see also Ginsberg, supra note
209, at 836 ("Largely self-regulated, doctors and sperm banks in the majority of states view
additional biological or genetic screening as purely optional."). This dearth of regulation is likely
the product of the secrecy surrounded the administration of AID and the moral and legal
1204
[Vol. 38: 1175, 2011] Putting the "Product" in Reproduction
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
United States alone, 240 artificial insemination has raised novel legal
questions that demand reflective legal answers.
As AID gained popularity, some states enacted statutes addressing
various aspects of its administration. 24 ' New York's regulation of tissue
banks and storage facilities, for instance, prohibits the sale of gametes for
valuable consideration.242 Georgia's statute relieves physicians of civil
liability other than negligence for the administration of artificial
insemination.243 Other states statutorily resolve parentage issues arising out
of the use of AID by modeling their regulations after the Uniform Parentage
Act of 1973,244 while some states recognize the increased use of AID by
single women, statutorily preventing the donor from asserting parental rights
or assuming parental obligations where there is no presumed father.245
Observers argue, however, that AID remains "an industry largely
unregulated, scientifically, socially, or medically, with inconsistent or
nonexistent record keeping practices."246
Recipients may expect that donors have been screened and their samples
have been tested to ensure that their sperm is free from disease or defect. 247
uncertainties of the practice. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
240. Daniels & Golden, supra note 215, at 6.
241. See infra notes 242-45 and accompanying text.
242. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4364(5) (McKinney, Westlaw through 2010 legislation) ("No
bank or storage facility shall sell or otherwise transfer tissue for valuable consideration. Valuable
consideration shall not include reasonable costs associated with the procurement, processing, storage
and distribution of tissue.").
243. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-37(b) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.) ("Any physician or
surgeon who obtains written authorization signed by both the husband and the wife authorizing him
or her to perform or administer artificial insemination shall be relieved of civil liability to the
husband and wife or to any child conceived by artificial insemination for the result or results of said
artificial insemination, provided that the written authorization provided for in this Code section shall
not relieve any physician or surgeon from any civil liability arising from his or her own negligent
administration or performance of artificial insemination.").
244. "If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife
is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in
law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a)
(1973), repealed by UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 904 (2000), 9B U.L.A. 407 (2001).
245. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West, Westlaw through c. 14 of 2011 Reg. Sess.)
("The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician and surgeon or to a licensed sperm bank for
use in artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization of a woman other than the donor's wife is
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.").
246. Shelf, supra note 16, at 1062. One author notes that, "[c]urrently, no legal restrictions limit
the number of times a sperm bank may use an individual donor's sperm in artificial insemination, or
the number of children that may be conceived." Bauman, supra note 214, at 199; see also Grady,
supra note 1, at F5 ("News reports and Internet tales abound of sperm donors who claim to have
fathered dozens or even more than 100 babies via one or more sperm banks, but the stories are
impossible to verify because there is no requirement that sperm-donor births be identified.").
247. See supra note 231 (observing that some couples use artificial insemination to prevent
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This was, in fact, an industry practice even during the early administration of
AID.248 There are, however, no legal requirements mandating genetic
testing of sperm donors. 24 9  While the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine (ASRM) and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology
(SART) have issued broad guidelines for evaluating potential donors, 250
their recommendations are just that-recommendations-and are not legally
enforceable. The federal government imposes only minimal requirements
for determining anonymouS251 gamete donor eligibility,25 2  which is
determined based on the results of donor screening and testing.253 These
requirements are intended to prevent the transmission of communicable
diseases.254 Although the FDA defines human cells, tissues or cellular or
passing a man's known genetic disease or defect to his child).
248. Alan Guttmacher, a famed obstetrician and gynecologist, reportedly tested the sperm
purchased from his medical students for syphilis and interviewed the donors regarding their heredity
and history of venereal disease. Daniels & Golden, supra note 215, at 10. Similarly, Dr. Ivy Albert
Pelzman of Georgetown University School of Medicine was described in a 1938 Time magazine
article as "carefully assessing the heredity and background of his donors-a list of fifteen men
drawn 'mostly from medical students and interns who are glad to get the $25 fee per insemination.'
Id.
249. See infra notes 250-57 and accompanying text.
250. See generally 2008 Guidelines, supra note 217.
251. The requirements for known gamete donors are even less demanding. Under the Code of
Federal Regulations, "[r]eproductive cells or tissue donated by a sexually intimate partner of the
recipient for reproductive use" are exempt from screening and testing. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.90(a)(2)
(2005). Additionally, directed donors are exempt from the retesting required under section
1271.85(d). 21 C.F.R. § 1271.85(d). A directed donor is defined as:
a donor of reproductive cells or tissue (including semen, oocytes, and embryos to which
the donor contributed the spermatozoa or oocyte) to a specific recipient, and who knows
and is known by the recipient before donation. The term directed reproductive donor
does not include a sexually intimate partner under § 1271.90.
21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(1).
252. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.45(b) ("A donor-eligibility determination, based on donor screening
and testing for relevant communicable disease agents and diseases, is required for all donors of cells
or tissue used in HCT/Ps, except as provided under § 1271.90.").
253. Section 1271.75 describes screening requirements. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.75. Section 1271.85
requires the testing of an anonymous sperm donor's specimen for the following: human
immunodeficiency virus, type 1; human immunodeficiency virus, type 2; hepatitis B virus; hepatitis
C virus; treponema pallidum; human T-lymphotropic virus, type I; human T-lymphotropic virus,
type 11; cytomegalovirus (CMV); chlamydia trachomatis; and neisseria gonorrhea. 21 C.F.R. §
1271.85(a)-(c).
254. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.85(a). To prevent the spread of communicable diseases, an anonymous
sperm donor's specimen must be quarantined and retested for him to be deemed eligible: Section
1271.60(a) requires that "semen from anonymous donors [be quarantined] until the retesting
required under § 1271.85(d) is complete." 21 C.F.R. § 1271.60(a). Section 1271.85(d) provides
that:
Except as provided under § 1271.90 and except for directed reproductive donors as
defined in § 1271.3(1), at least 6 months after the date of donation of semen from
anonymous donors, you must collect a new specimen from the donor and test it for
evidence of infection due to the communicable disease agents for which testing is
required under paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this section.
21 C.F.R. § 1271.85(d).
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tissue-based products (HCT/Ps) as "articles containing or consisting of
human cells or tissues that are intended for implantation, transplantation,
infusion, or transfer into a human recipient. . . includ[ing] . . . semen or
other reproductive tissue,, 255 it specifically exempts human reproductive
tissue from its Current Good Tissue Practice rule.256 As such, there are
currently no enforceable guidelines for the genetic screening and testing of
sperm donors.257
Because of its questionable moral and legal nature,258 the development
of AID in the United States has been shrouded in secrecy and has remained,
despite gaining popular acceptance, largely unregulated.259 Critics have
made various proposals to address the dearth of regulation of the AID
industry.260 While some envision regulation through a national databank of
gamete donors,26' others call for increased access for AID offspring to donor
records,262 and others still call for the adoption of mandatory, uniform
guidelines for donor screening, including genetic testing.263 In 2009, the
case of Donovan v. Idant Laboratories introduced the possibility of an
entirely new mechanism for AID regulation-products liability litigation.2 6
C The Seminal Case ofDonovan v. Idant LaboratorieS265
In 2009, in a case of first impression, a federal court judge held that a
mentally disabled child-and, but for statutory limitations, her mother-
255. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d) (emphasis added).
256. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.150(c)(3) ("[T]he regulations in this subpart are not being implemented
for reproductive HCT/Ps . .. or for the establishments that manufacture them.").
257. See supra notes 249-56 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 215.
259. See supra notes 246-57 and accompanying text.
260. See infra notes 261-63 and accompanying text.
261. See Naomi Cahn, Necessary Subjects: The Need for a Mandatory National Donor Gamete
Databank, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 203, 205-06 (2009) [hereinafter Cahn, Necessary
Subjects]. Cahn argues:
[B]eyond satisfying the needs of many donor offspring and their families to find
connections, a national databank would prevent the same donor from providing gametes
to numerous banks and numerous families. Existing limits within banks are
unenforceable across banks unless donors are identified. A registry might even help with
sharing critical medical information between donor-created families.
Id.
262. See Bauman, supra note 214, at 216-17; see also Shelf, supra note 16, at 1061-62.
263. See Ginsberg, supra note 209, at 843. See generally Yaniv Heled, Comment, The Regulation
of Genetic Aspects of Donated Reproductive Tissue-The Need for Federal Regulation, 11 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 243 (2010).
264. 625 F. Supp. 2d 256 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
265. Id at 256.
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could sue a sperm bank under a products liability theory of recovery based
on a genetic defect inherited from a sperm donor.266 Although
reconsideration was subsequently granted and the case was dismissed for
failure to allege a legally cognizable injury,267 the Donovan holding
introduced the possibility that human sperm may be treated as a product
under products liability law. 268
In 1994, Pennsylvania resident Donna Donovan entered into a contract
with Idant Laboratories, a New York Corporation, to purchase semen for the
purpose of artificial insemination. 26 9  As part of the agreement, Donna
signed a consent form, which included representations as to the high quality
of Idant's product. 2 70 After selecting Donor G738, 27' Donna paid a fee, and
Idant shipped the semen to her physician.272 Donna was subsequently
inseminated with Donor G738's semen, and on January 4, 1996, she gave
273birth to a daughter, Brittany Donovan.
After her pediatrician observed developmental abnormalities, Brittany
was referred to various treatment facilities, and on December 19, 1997, she
was diagnosed as a Fragile X2 74 carrier. 2 75  Two months later, genetic tests
revealed that Donna did not carry the disease.276 On May 6, 1998, however,
Donor G738 was identified as a Fragile X carrier.277
On July 16, 2008, Donna filed a complaint against Idant on behalf of
266. Id. at 262-63, 273.
267. Id. at 276.
268. Id. at 273.
269. Id. at 262.
270. Id. The consent form included representations that "(1) semen stored at Idant is
exceptionally safe; (2) Idant has a screening program that far exceeds mandated standards; and (3)
Idant's donors go through a rigorous screening process to ensure that they have a good genetic
background and history." Id.
271. Donna alleged that Idant made additional representations following her selection, specifically
that:
Donor G738 had been fully tested in accordance with New York Health Regulations and
that information did not indicate that he had any genetic defects or a history of mental
retardation.. .. [Idant further] represented that Donor G738 had been a donor for over
two years, his sperm had been quarantined and stored for over six months before use[,]




274. "Fragile X Syndrome, also known as Martin-Bell Syndrome, is a genetic syndrome which
results in a spectrum of physical, intellectual, emotional and behavioral characteristics which range
from severe to mild in manifestation." Id. at 263. Fragile X affects approximately 0.02% of white
men: "According to the CDC, the prevalence of the full mutation in [C]aucasian populations is
approximately I in 4,000 to I in 6,000 males. Female children of female carriers have a 50% chance
of inheriting the disease and female children of male carriers have a 100% chance of inheriting the
disease." Id.
275. Id at 262-63.
276. Id at 263.
277. Id
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herself and on behalf of Brittany, still a minor, alleging "negligence, breach
of contract, third-party beneficiary breach of contract, breach of the express
warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of merchantability,
negligent misrepresentation, strict products liability and negligent infliction
of emotional distress" for providing Ms. Donovan with "defective sperm."278
The plaintiffs based their claims on Idant's failure to test Donor G738's
semen for Fragile X, 279 alleging "that Donor G738 exhibited symptoms of
Fragile X which defendant failed to recognize."280
Having decided that the plaintiffs' claims were governed by
Pennsylvania's statutes of limitations,2 8 1 but that New York substantive law
would apply,282 the court held that Donna's claims were time-barred, 283
regardless of whether or not the court applied the "discovery rule"284 to
extend the statute of limitations. Due to the application of the
278. Id. at 262.
279. "Though it was first described in 1943, it was not until 1991 that scientists discovered the
gene (called FMRl for 'Fragile X Mental Retardation-I') that causes Fragile X. A DNA test for
Fragile X was developed in 1992"-three years before Idant supplied Donna with Donor G738's
semen. Id. at 263.
280. Id. Fragile X symptoms are generally more apparent in male carriers than in female carriers:
As the disease is carried on the X chromosome and men only have one X chromosome,
male carriers are likely to exhibit symptoms of Fragile X at a much more severe level
than females, though some females exhibit severe symptoms. According to the Fragile X
Research Foundation, though symptoms vary even among those affected in the same
family, the signs and symptoms frequently include some variation of mental impairment,
ranging from learning disabilities to mental retardation, attention deficit and hyperactivity
anxiety, unstable moods, autistic behaviors, seizures and physical features including a
long face, large ears, flat feet and hyper-extensible joints.
Id
281. Id. at 264.
282. The court found that New York law applied to the contract claims "since the majority of the
conduct relevant to the contract at issue, i.e. the testing and screening, took place in New York and
New York has a strong policy incentive to regulate the sperm banks in its state." Id. at 270. The
court likewise held that New York law applied to the tort claims; although "the injury and the harm
took place in Pennsylvania, the screening and testing at issue in the tort claims took place in New
York. There is no allegation that any tortious activity took place in Pennsylvania." Id at 271.
283. Id. at 267.
284. "Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations is tolled until a plaintiff 'knew or should
have known on the exercise of reasonable diligence of [her] injury and its cause."' Id. at 266 (citing
Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 858 (Pa. 2005)).
285. "A cause of action accrues 'as soon as the right to institute and maintain a suit arises, which
generally is when the injury was inflicted."' Id at 265 (quoting Padalino v. Standard Fire Ins. Co.,
616 F. Supp. 2d. 538, 546 (E.D. Pa. 2008)). The date of Donna's injury could be the time of
implantation (in 1995), the date that she gave birth (January 4, 1996), or when she noticed Brittany's
developmental delays (in the months following her birth). Id. at 266. Even applying the discovery
rule, Donna's cause of action accrued at the latest on May 6, 1998, when Donna learned that that
Donor G738 was a Fragile X carrier; at that time, "she knew or should have known that she had been
injured and who had likely caused the injury." Id. at 267. Thus, the two-year statute of limitations
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Pennsylvania Minors' Tolling Statute,286 however, Brittany's claims were
not time-barred,287 and the court proceeded to address Brittany's claims for
"negligence, breach of contract as a third-party beneficiary, breaches of the
express and implied warranties as a third-party beneficiary, negligent
misrepresentation and strict products liability." 288
The court found that Brittany's claims for negligence and negligent
misrepresentation constituted claims for wrongful life2 89 and dismissed both
for failure to state a claim. 290 Due to a dispute over the identities of the
contracting parties, " the court postponed ruling on Brittany's third-party
beneficiary breach of contract and breach of warranty claims.292 Finally,
with very little discussion, the court denied Idant's motion to dismiss
Brittany's claim for strict liability, holding that "under New York law, the
sale of sperm is considered a product and is subject to strict liability." 293
Noting that "[s]everal states including Pennsylvania and New York have by
statute exempted human biological products from strict liability and [hold]
them to be a service," 294 the court relied upon the language of New York's
for tort claims and four-year statute of limitations for breach of contract both expired long before
Donna filed suit on July 16, 2008. Id. at 266-67.
286. "[I]n Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for claims brought by minors does not run until
two years after reaching the age of majority which is 18." Id. at 265 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5533(b)(1)(i-ii) (Purdon, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. and Ist Special Sess.)).
287. Id. at 265.
288. Id. at 269.
289. Inheriting Fragile X caused Brittany to suffer from:
permanently impaired developmental communication and play, motor planning, sensory
and cognitive skills and . . . a high risk for premature ovarian failure and early
menopause. She has already been diagnosed with ovarian cysts and is having problems
with her menstrual cycles. . . . [Slhe has difficulties with shyness, social anxiety, and is
at risk for eye problems, seizures and mitral valve prolapse. Moreover, ... any children
she has will be at a high risk for the same problems (a child of a female carrier has a 50%
chance of inheriting the disease) so ... Brittany will have to arrange for donor eggs to
avoid this complication in any offspring.
Id. at 263-64. The court explained, however, that Brittany's claims for negligence and negligent
misrepresentation were "based on the fact that, if defendant had properly tested and screened for
genetic abnormalities in Donor G738's semen, that semen would not have been used and plaintiff
Brittany Donovan would not have been bom." Id. at 271. Thus, the injury alleged is not the
difference between life with Fragile X and life without Fragile X; rather, it is the difference between
life with Fragile X and no life at all-constituting a claim for wrongful life. Id
290. Id. at 271. "'[I]t is well settled that no cause of action may be maintained on behalf of an
infant plaintiff for "wrongful life" i.e., that he or she would never have been born but for the
negligence of the defendant."' Id. at 271 (quoting Figueroa v. Giffone, No. 100866/2005, 2009 WL
27763, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 5, 2009)). "Additionally, under New York law, there is no duty of
care owed 'to an individual who was not yet in utero when the alleged negligence occurred."' Id
(quoting Andrews v. Keltz, 838 N.Y.S.2d 363, 370 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007)).
291. Idant claimed that the contract was between Idant and Donna's treating physician-not
between Idant and Donna. Id. at 272.
292. Id.
293. Id at 273.
294. Id
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blood shield statute2 95 -in particular, the absence of the word "tissue" 296 -
in reaching its decision.297
On reconsideration in June of 2009, Idant argued that Brittany's strict
liability and third-party beneficiary breach of warranty claims "are properly
termed claims of 'wrongful life,"'298 which New York does not recognize.299
Siding with Idant, the court found it "impossible to distinguish [Brittany's]
economic injuries from those of a claim for wrongful life"300 on the basis
that "Courts have declined to determine the economic value of the life of a
person with disabilities as compared to having no life at all."3 o' In
dismissing Brittany's strict liability and warranty claims for failure to state a
claim due to her inability to allege a legally cognizable injury, the court
295. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 580(4) (McKinney, Westlaw through 2010 legislation) ("The
collection, processing, storage, distribution or use of blood, blood components or blood derivatives
for the purpose of diagnosis, prevention or treatment of disease is hereby declared to be a public
health service and shall not be construed to be, and is declared not to be, a sale of such blood, blood
components or blood derivatives, for any purpose or purposes whatsoever.").
296. The court noted:
While other state blood shield laws and the Restatement (Third) of Torts-Product
Liability § 19 include human tissue and/or organs in the list of products which are
exempted, the relevant New York statute does not and no case law has extended the
statute to also exempt human tissues like sperm.
Donovan, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 273.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 275.
299. Id. (citing Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978)). The court stated:
The New York Court of Appeals has concluded that an infant alleging a claim of
wrongful life has not suffered a legally cognizable injury because "whether it is better
never to have been born at all than to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a
mystery more properly to be left to the philosophers and the theologians," and because
the remedy afforded an injured party in tort is designed to place that party in the position
that she would have occupied but for the alleged negligence. A cause of action based on
"wrongful life" seeks to put the child in the position of having not received the defective
sperm, "thereby depriving the infant plaintiff of [her] very existence."
Id (citation omitted) (quoting Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978)).
300. Id. The court explained:
If the sperm at issue was defective . . . , to place plaintiff in the position which she would
have occupied had the product not been distributed . . . would be to alter plaintiffs
genetic identity so that she would be someone else. These injuries are identical to the
injury that New York courts consistently find not to be legally cognizable in causes of
action for negligence and medical malpractice, regardless of whether the plaintiffs argue
that their claims do not allege wrongful life.
Id. at 275-76.
301. Id. at 275 (citing Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 807); see also Thomas A. Warnock, Comment,
Scientific Advancements: Will Technology Make the Unpopular Wrongful Birth/Life Causes of
Action Extinct?, 19 TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 173, 175 (2001) ("Wrongful life has been
characterized as one of the most controversial pregnancy related torts.").
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acknowledged the absence of precedent 302 but surmised that the Court of
Appeals of New York "would find that the injuries alleged in [Brittany's]
strict liability and warranty claims are essentially claims for wrongful
life."303 The court did not, however, disturb its finding that Idant's sale of
sperm to Donna Donovan constituted the sale of a product, leaving open the
possibility of future products liability claims based on transactions involving
genetically defective sperm.3" The Third Circuit subsequently affirmed the
district court's decision, finding that the statute of limitations for Donna's
claims was neither tolled on the basis of the discovery rule nor the fraudulent
concealment doctrine, and it further held that the district court correctly
dismissed Brittany's claims for failure to allege a legally cognizable
injury.sos
III. PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS FOR GENETICALLY DEFECTIVE SPERM:
FERTILE GROUNDS FOR RECOVERY?
There have been a variety of problems with artificial insemination:
recipients have contracted HIV' and received the wrong sperm, 30 doctors
have used their own sperm to fraudulently impregnate dozens of women,308
and children have inherited genetic diseases and defects from anonymous
sperm donors 3 0 9-yet artificial insemination remains a highly popular
302. "New York courts have not yet barred actions other than for negligence or medical
malpractice as being prohibited claims of wrongful life." Donovan, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 274 n.2.
303. Id. at 276.
304. In dicta, the court noted that its decision would not foreclose the success of a parent's claim
for wrongful birth under New York law, "whether in negligence or otherwise, for the injury of
pecuniary losses of the costs incurred in raising a child with disabilities." Id. at 276 n.3 (citing
Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 807). The court distinguished the parent's injury from that of the child:
To bring the parent of a child with disabilities to the position in which she would have
been had the act causing the disability not occurred is an economic issue. However, to
bring that child into the position in which she would have been had the act causing her
genetic disorder not taken place, her genetic identity would be different, so the [child]
would not exist. Thus, while Donna Donovan could show a financial injury, her claims
have been time-barred and the minor plaintiff has not alleged her own financial injury
distinguishable from a claim for wrongful life.
Id. (citations omitted).
305. D.D. v. Idant Labs., 374 F. App'x 319 (3rd Cir. 2010).
306. See supra note 224 and accompanying text; see also Heather J. Blum, Comment, Tort
Liability as the Result ofthe Transmission ofHIV Through Artificial Insemination by Donor, 4 ALB.
L.J. Sci. & TECH. 333 (1994) (considering the potential for tort liability when an AID recipient
contracts HIV through artificial insemination).
307. See Hamicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 71-72 (Utah 1998) (wrong sperm
used in in vitro fertilization procedure); see also Ginsberg, supra note 209, at 829 (woman
mistakenly inseminated with "the sperm of an unknown donor, rather than that of her dying
husband").
308. See Marlene Cimons, Fertility Doctor's Case Raises Ethical Concerns, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13,
1992, at 30, available at 1992 WLNR 3961144 (describing how a fertility doctor used his own
sperm to father as many as seventy-five children).
309. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text (five Michigan children inherited SCN from an
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practice. 310  Resulting in 30,000 births annually and remaining largely
unregulated, 311 artificial insemination is likely to be the subject of future
litigation. 312  As introduced in Donovan, products liability law is one
possible mechanism for regulating AID.313
A. Putting the "Product" in Reproduction
In a successful products liability action, the thing that caused the
plaintiff's injury must be a product.3 14 Consequently, in the case of an
artificially inseminated woman giving birth to a child with a genetic defect
inherited from the sperm donor, the first question that must be considered is
whether sperm is a product.
Sperm is not a typical product.3 " Although one might argue that it is
mass-produced1 and that it satisfies the definition of chattel,317 sperm is
unlikely to come to mind when thinking about products.3 18 For one thing,
anonymous sperm donor); see also notes 269-77 and accompanying text (Brittany Donovan
inherited Fragile X from an anonymous donor); Johnson v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 80 Cal.
App. 4th 1050 (2000) (Brittany Johnson inherited Autosomal Dominant Polycystic Kidney Disease
from an anonymous sperm donor with a family history of kidney disease); Doolan v. IVF Am.
(MA), Inc., No. 99-3476, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 581, at *8-12 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000) (child
born with cystic fibrosis due to fertility clinic's negligent genetic screening of in vitro fertilization
embryos); Ginsberg, supra note 209, at 830 (child inherited cystic fibrosis from an anonymous donor
despite reassurances from the sperm bank that it screened for the condition).
310. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 234-59 and accompanying text.
312. Ginsberg, supra note 209, at 828 ("The rarity of litigation over unsafe artificial insemination
techniques should not give potential [artificial insemination] candidates a false sense of security
about the quality of the procedure nationwide; rather, the lack of precedent may stem from the fact
that most of these cases are resolved in hushed, out-of-court settlements intended to conceal the risks
of [artificial insemination] from the public."). Further, "many genetic disorders, such as
Huntington's disease, often do not appear until late in life, and therefore some AID children may
carry such traits and not yet be aware of them." McIntyre, supra note 209, at 521.
313. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
316. See Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social Security
Survivor's Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 270 (1999)
("[A] single ejaculate could contain more than 400 million sperm." (footnote omitted)). In 2000,
mean sperm density was 56 million sperm per milliliter with an average volume of 2.7 milliliters per
sample. Hamida Begum et al., Environmental and Nutritional Aspect in Male Infertility, 10 J. MED.
16, 16 (2009).
317. Chattel is defined as "[m]ovable or transferable property; personal property, esp., a physical
object capable of manual delivery and not the subject matter of real property." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 251 (8th ed. West 2004).
318. In contrast to chattel, product is defined as "[s]omething that is distributed commercially for
use or consumption and that is [usually] (1) tangible personal property, (2) the result of fabrication
or processing, and (3) an item that has passed through a chain of commercial distribution before
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each sperm is a living entity,"' its purpose is to fertilize an egg and produce
a resulting offspring, 32 0 and it occurs naturally in the human body without
any effort or innovation on the part of man32 1 -even though its retrieval may
be another story.322
Although sperm is not produced as a "result of fabrication or
processing," 323 donor sperm is regularly sold for use through a chain of
commercial distribution,324 and it can certainly be categorized as tangible
personal property.325 In fact, several courts have recognized a property
interest in sperm.326 Consequently, while sperm's unique qualities place it at
the outer boundaries of the products field,327 it can nonetheless appropriately
be considered a product. 3 28
The legal treatment of animal semen supports the classification of sperm
as a product. 329 For instance, bull semen has been recognized as a product 330
ultimate use or consumption." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1245 (8th ed. West 2004).
319. Ernest Waintraub, Are Sperm Cells a Form of Property? A Biological Inquiry into the Legal
Status ofthe Sperm Cell, 11 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 1, 10 (2007).
320. Id at 10-11.
321. See id. at 9-11 (discussing spermatogenesis, or the maturation of sperm cells).
Spermatogonia, germ cells with forty-six chromosomes, rest dormant in the testes until the male
reaches puberty. Id. at 9. At puberty, "spermatogonia replicate DNA and divide to give rise to
primary spermatocytes," each of which genetically recombines and divides to produce two
spermatocytes, such that each resulting spermatocyte has twenty-three chromosomes. Id. The
spermatocytes then divide a second time, producing a total of four spermatids, each with twenty-
three chromosomes. Id. at 9-10. Over time, the spermatids develop into mature sperm cells, after
which they acquire forward motility. Id. at 10.
322. See, e.g., Carson Strong, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Sperm Retrieval After Death or
Persistent Vegetative State, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 347 (1999) (discussing postmortem methods of
extracting sperm).
323. See supra notes 318-19 and accompanying text.
324. See infra notes 347-63 and accompanying text.
325. Property is something that can be "used, destroyed, given away, sold, and so forth." Bonnie
Steinbock, Sperm as Property, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 57, 57 (1995). Tangible personal property
is "[c]orporeal personal property of any kind; personal property that can be seen, weighed,
measured, felt, or touched, or is in any other way perceptible to the senses, such as furniture, cooking
utensils, and books." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1254 (8th ed. West 2004). Capable of being
"seen, weighed, measured, felt, [and] touched," and regularly "used destroyed, given away, [and]
sold," sperm can be found to satisfy the definition of tangible personal property. See also Kermit
Roosevelt III, The Newest Property: Reproductive Technologies and the Concept of Parenthood, 39
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 79, 79 (1998) (finding that the law recognizes property rights in human
reproductive materials); David A. Rameden, Note, Frozen Semen as Property in Hecht v. Superior
Court: One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward, 62 UMKC L. REv. 377, 395 (1994) ("[F]rozen
semen .. . exhibits all of the basic attributes of property.").
326. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 275 (Ct. App. 1993); Kurchner v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 858 So. 2d 1220, 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Phillips v. Irons, No. 1-03-
2992, 2005 WL 4694579, at *6 (111. App. Ct. 2005).
327. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (identifying the types of products that exist at the
outer boundaries of the products field).
328. See infra notes 330-39 and accompanying text.
329. See infra notes 330-44 and accompanying text.
330. See Two Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., 624 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1980).
1214
[Vol. 38: 1175, 2011] Putting the "Product" in Reproduction
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
and has regularly been the subject of sales contracts. 331 In Two Rivers Co. v.
Curtiss Breeding Service, the Fifth Circuit considered whether a seller was
liable for damages based in strict liability in tort and breach of implied
warranty for providing bull semen that carried a genetic defect.332 In
analyzing the issue, the court, without discussion, identified the semen as a
product.333 It struggled, however, to classify the injury that the plaintiff
suffered as a result of the genetically defective semen.3 34 Focusing on the
nature of the injury,335 the court found that strict liability could not support
the plaintiffs claim for economic loss336 and further held that the defendant
331. See, e.g., Genex Coop., Inc. v. Bujnevicie, No. CIV. 00-120-M, 2000 WL 1507319 (D.N.H.
Jul. 17, 2000); Persson v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, Nos. 6472-86 & 41889-86, 1989 WL
123010 (T.C. Oct. 19, 1989); Gray v. ABS Global, Inc., 850 So. 2d 180 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003); J.R.
Prentice v. Williams, 324 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
332. 624 F.2d 1242, 1243-44 (5th Cir. 1980). In Two Rivers, the plaintiff contracted with the
defendant to purchase bull semen to artificially inseminate its cattle. Id. at 1243. The plaintiff
inseminated sixty-four of its heifers, but it stopped using the purchased semen after learning that the
bull had sired other offspring exhibiting signs of syndactylism, a genetic abnormality that is only
apparent when both the sire and the dam carry the recessive gene. Id. at 1244-45. As a result of the
sixty-four inseminations, twenty-two calves were born alive, and four were stillborn, exhibiting
signs of syndactylism. Id. at 1244. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant sold it a genetically
defective product and sued the defendant seeking damages for the lost value of the stillborn calves
and for the injured reputation of the remaining herd. Id. at 1245-47.
333. Id. at 1248.
334. The court had difficulty defining the nature of the injury to the calves born with syndactylism
or the recessive gene, stating that "[t]he damage suffered by Two Rivers does not fit neatly into any
one of the four categories [of property loss recognized in Texas]." Id. at 1247. The four types of
loss discussed were (1) "personal injury to the user (or consumer) or physical injury to the property
of the user (or consumer)"; (2) direct economic loss "resulting from a product with defective
workmanship or materials"; (3) "'economic loss to the purchased product itself'"; and (4) "a hybrid
involving physical harm to a plaintiffs other property as well as to the product itself." Id. at 1245
(quoting Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Service, 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex.
1978)). The court suggested that the situation may involve the third category of loss and would
therefore involve non-recoverable economic loss based on the argument that "a calf is a continuation
of the product (bull semen) so any damage was to the product itself and not to any other property."
Id. at 1247-48. The court indicated, however, that the situation may instead involve the fourth
category of loss, as it could "be argued that the product (bull semen) is a constituent part of a new
product (the calf) which is other property. Because there is damage to other property . . . [the
plaintiff could recover] under the doctrine of strict liability." Id. at 1248. Considering the
differences between "mechanical items involving incorporation of parts into a whole" and the
natural process of fertilization "where the product (bull semen) reacts with another product to create
something new," the court noted that neither type of loss squarely fit the situation. Id.
335. Comparing the situation to Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. Talley, 493 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973), a case involving defective corn seed, the court ultimately concluded that the injury was
one of economic loss only. Two Rivers. 624 F.2d at 1250.
336. Under Texas law, a plaintiff can receive damages for economic loss under negligence or
breach of implied warranty, but not under strict liability. Id. at 1246. The Texas Supreme Court
defined direct economic loss as:
damage based on insufficient product value; thus, direct economic loss may be "out of
pocket"-the difference in value between what is given and received-or "loss of
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effectively disclaimed any implied warranties. In so holding, the Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court's award of damages 338-but the court did
not waiver in classifying semen as a product.339
Although animal sperm has been treated as a product and human sperm
exhibits the same characteristics as animal sperm,340 section 19(c) of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability explicitly excludes human
blood and human tissue from the definition of "product."3 41 This exclusion
is based on the rationale that "public policy concerns behind the availability
of both human blood and tissue outweigh the risks inherent in their
supply."34 2 Because there is no urgent need for a readily available supply of
sperm (as there is for blood or other tissue), however, such public policy
concerns are not relevant to the classification of sperm.343 In fact, one might
even argue that the contrary is true-that public policy favors the treatment
of human sperm as a product.3" Even if courts opt to treat human sperm as
bargain"-the difference between the value of what is received and its value as
represented. Direct economic loss also may be measured by costs of replacement and
repair.
Id. at 1246 n.2 (quoting Nobility Homes of Tex. Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 78 n.l (Tex. 1977)).
Consequential economic loss, in contrast, "includes all indirect loss, such as loss of profits resulting
from inability to make use of the defective product." Id.
337. Id. at 1251-53.
338. Id at 1245.
339. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
340. Both serve the purpose of fertilizing an egg, and both are produced naturally without any
effort on the part of the male. See supra notes 320-21 and accompanying text.
341. Comment c of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability section 19 explains:
Although human blood and human tissue meet the formal requisites of Subsection (a),
they are specifically excluded from the coverage of this Restatement. Almost all the
litigation regarding such products has dealt with contamination of human blood and
blood-related products by the hepatitis virus or the HIV virus. Absent a special rule
dealing with human blood and tissue, such contamination presumably would be subject to
the rules of §§ I and 2(a). Those sections impose strict liability when a product departs
from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation
and marketing of the product. However, legislation in almost all jurisdictions limits the
liability of sellers of human blood and human tissue to the failure to exercise reasonable
care, often by providing that human blood and human tissue are not "products" or that
their provision is a "service." Where legislation has not addressed the problem, courts
have concluded that strict liability is inappropriate for harm caused by such product
contamination.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 19 cmt. c (1998); see also supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
342. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB., Reporters' Note, § 19 cmt. c (1998).
343. See Steinbock, supra note 325, at 65 ("Sperm, unlike blood, is not lifesaving, nor necessary
for health.").
344. This position can actually be supported by the text of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability:
When the applicable definition fails to provide an unequivocal answer, decisions
regarding whether a "product" is involved are reached in light of the public policies
behind the imposition of strict liability in tort. Some of the policy considerations include:
(1) the public interest in life and health; (2) the invitations and solicitations of the
manufacturer to purchase the product; (3) the justice of imposing the loss on the
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a product, commercial transfers of sperm must also be categorized as sales to
bring the transaction within the scope of products liability law.345
B. Artificial Insemination: Selling the Goods or Providing a Service?
For a sperm transaction to fall within the scope of products liability law,
the transaction must constitute a sale of goods rather than the rendering of a
service.346 Although some may find it distasteful to treat the commercial
transfer of human reproductive tissue as the equivalent of any other
transaction, this ignores reality: "In the fertility industry the
commodification of gametes and embryos is entirely accepted, with the sole
exception of Louisiana's prohibition on the sale of embryos."347
Not only is the commercial nature of sperm transfers evident from the
transaction itself,348 but it is also prevalent in the industry's marketing,
which targets both sperm purchaserS349 and sperm donors. 350  For example,
manufacturer who created the risk and reaped the profit; (4) the superior ability of the
commercial enterprise to distribute the risk of injury as a cost of doing business; (5) the
disparity in position and bargaining power that forces the consumer to depend entirely on
the manufacturer; (6) the difficulty in requiring the injured party to trace back along the
channel of trade to the source of the defect in order to prove negligence; and (7) whether
the product is in the stream of commerce.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB., Reporters' Note, § 19 cmt. a (1998).
345. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
346. Id. The question of whether sperm transactions constitute a sale of goods or the rendering of
a service triggers other questions-for instance, whether there should be a uniform rule that
characterizes these transactions (i.e., all commercial transfers of sperm constitute a service) or
whether the classification as sale or service may vary depending on the type of transaction and
method of insemination (for example, physician-selected and administered AID versus self-selected
sperm administered through self-insemination). See infra note 375 and accompanying text.
347. Shelf, supra note 16, at 1065 n.104; see also Swink & Reich, supra note 4, at 878 ("No one
disputes that sperm is a product that has the potential to create life; however, on the open market,
sperm is a 'good' that is bought and sold in the course of interstate commerce.").
348. See, e.g., Daniels & Golden, supra note 215, at 17 ("Sales and business practices in the
sperm banking industry resemble those of other retailers. The largest banks offer fully-articulated
product liability and return policies: no returns for unused product and credit issued to buyers if
sperm falls below minimum sperm counts, arrangements for shipping via private carriers, credit card
purchasing, and marketing via the internet."); see also Frozen Donor Semen Purchase/Storage
Agreement, CAL. CRYOBANK, available at http://www.cryobank.com/ resources/pdf/Documents/
PurchaseStorageAgreement.pdf [hereinafter Purchase and Storage Agreement].
349. See infra notes 351-64 and accompanying text.
350. California Cryobank advertises that sperm donors can "Earn up to $1200.00/month" and "Be
your own boss-Donate at your convenience up to 3 times a week." Cal. Cryobank, Inc., Calfornia
Cryobank Sperm Donor Compensation, SPERMBANK.cOM, http://www.spermbank.com/new
donors/index.cfm?ID-4 (last visited Feb. 16, 2011). In promoting the benefits of sperm donation,
California Cryobank even provides donor testimonials: "I really love the convenience and ease that
comes with being a CCB donor. I can fit it into my schedule without worrying about deadlines."
Cal. Cryobank, Inc., Sperm Donor Testimonials, SPERMBANK.COM, http://www.spermbank.corm/
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California Cryobank invites prospective sperm purchasers to peruse its
donor catalog, which includes a list of donors and numerous images of
babies-including an infant emerging from a box labeled "FRAGILE" and
five babies lounging in an ice cube tray.5 California Cryobank also
provides the option of selecting a donor using its "advanced search" feature
on its website, which is literally a checklist of donor characteristics-
including skin tone, eye color, hair color, hair texture, height, level of
education, area of study, ethnicity, religion, and blood type. 35 2 In doing so,
the industry effectively "markets the 'traits' of donors"353 like any other
commodity. 354
Even beyond the selection of a donor, every step in a commercial sperm
transaction suggests that it is a typical sale of goods.55 California Cryobank
charges $335 to $685 per vial of donor semen, with several factors affecting
price.3 s6 For an additional fee, purchasers can obtain donor information
packages, which may include the donor's baby photograph, audio interview,
handwriting analysis, full profile, and facial features report.357 California
Cryobank also offers optional related services, including donor matching
consultation, genetic counseling, and private storage at an added cost-but
newdonors/index.cfm?ID=51 (last visited Feb. 16, 2011). "It's been a great way to supplement my
income on my schedule. I love the free snacks." Id. "A very warm and friendly place, very
supportive and helpful staff and a really cool donor coordinator. Plus lots of perks!!!-free movie
tickets, a massage chair, and free snacks." Id. Although sperm banks often suggest that donors are
compensated for their time and services, rather than for the sperm itself, this is inaccurate.
California Cryobank, for example, does not compensate donors for the first sperm sample provided,
"as it is only used for analysis." Cal. Cryobank, Inc., Sperm Donor Screening Process,
SPERMBANK.cOM, http://www.spermbank.com/newdonors/index.cfm?D=9 (last visited Jan. 30,
2011). The same amount of time and services are required to provide the first sample as is required
for any other sample, but the sperm donor is not compensated for the first sample-which is used for
analysis, rather than for sale to a prospective purchaser. Id Even after a donor's sample is analyzed
and his application is accepted, he is only compensated for "acceptable donations." Id
351. DONOR CATALOG - JAN, FEB, MAR 2011, CAL. CRYOBANK, available at http://www.
cryobank.com/_resources/pdf/catalogs/print-catalog.pdf.
352. Advanced Search, CAL. CRYOBANK, http://www.cryobank.com/Donor-SearchlAdvanced-
Search/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2011). There is even a box to check for purchasers to select those
"must have" features. Id. One industry observer has commented that, "[i]n short, in contemporary
society, sperm is a commodity, alienated from its producer and yet sold as the embodiment of that
producer's particular traits." Daniels & Golden, supra note 215, at 5.
353. Daniels & Golden, supra note 215, at 6.
354. This point is illustrated by a comparison of California Cryobank's website with the popular
American Girl website, where one can select for skin tone, eye color, hair color, and hair texture to
create a "my American Girl" doll. MY AM. GIRL, http://store.americangirl.com/html/myagconfig2/
main.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2011).
355. See infra notes 356-64 and accompanying text.
356. Services Fees, CAL. CRYOBANK, http://www.cryobank.com/Services/Pricing/ (last visited
Feb. 16, 2011). Pricing variables include whether the donor is anonymous or open, the specimen is
intended for intracervical (standard unwashed) or intrauterine (pre-washed prior to freezing)
insemination, and the specimen's density (premium or A.R.T.). Id.
357. Id.
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California Cryobank does not actually administer artificial insemination.
After selecting a donor and submitting the Purchase and Storage
Agreement,359 a purchaser can place an order online or by telephone, and the
sperm vials will be shipped in liquid nitrogen "dry" shippers, domestically
or internationally, to either the purchaser's home or her physician's office.360
Finally, California Cryobank pressures its consumers to stock up on donor
sperm, cautioning: "Once you find your ideal donor, the only way to
guarantee he will be available in the future is to purchase and store extra
vials. Whether you are hoping for one, two, or ten children, planning ahead
is very important." 3 61  AID is no longer just a treatment administered by
physicians to treat infertility; 362 it is now a consumer-dominated commercial
transaction in which a purchaser can select a commodity from a catalog
based on size and color, buy it online with a credit card, and have it shipped
to her residence363-yet commercial sperm transfers may nonetheless be
treated as the rendering of a service.36"
Despite the widespread commodification of sperm sales, such transfers
may be statutorily defined as services-regardless of the actual nature of the
transaction.365 In an effort to protect the national blood supply, most states
have enacted "blood shield" laws that serve to limit the liability of suppliers
of blood and blood products.366 Some statutes limit suppliers' liability to
claims of negligence or willful misconduct,367 others expressly exempt
358. Services, CAL. CRYOBANK, http://www.cryobank.com/Services/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
359. See Purchase and Storage Agreement, supra note 348.
360. Ordering and Shipment, CAL. CRYOBANK, http://www.cryobank.com/How-It-Works/
Ordering-and-Shipment/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
361. Storage Process, CAL. CRYOBANK, http://www.cryobank.com/How-It-Works/Storage-Process/
(last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
362. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 348-61 and accompanying text.
364. See infra notes 365-73 and accompanying text.
365. See infra note 373 and accompanying text.
366. Many courts have declined to impose no-fault liability on blood suppliers in order to:
ensure the continued availability of blood transfusions, an extremely beneficial medical
procedure . . . . As the concern over liability for supplying contaminated blood has
grown during the recent AIDS crisis, many states have statutorily adopted [this]
approach. These so-called "blood shield statutes" expressly provide that the supply of
blood for transfusions is a medical service and not a sale ....
McIntyre, supra note 209, at 529.
367. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-33-104 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation). Montana's
statute states:
No blood bank or tissue bank may be held liable in the absence of fault or negligence for
injuries resulting from the injecting, transfusing, transplanting, or transferring of whole
blood, plasma, blood products, blood derivatives, human tissue, organs, or bones supplied
by any such blood bank or tissue bank to any hospital or physician if such blood products
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suppliers of blood and blood products from strict liability and breach of
implied warranty claims, 368 and yet others still preclude strict liability and
breach of warranty claims by explicitly determining that suppliers are
rendering a service rather than furnishing a product.3 69 Although such laws
or tissue products have been tested by the latest testing procedures in accordance with
recommendations of the American association of blood banks or the American
association of tissue banks and by such test are not found to be dangerous to the health of
the recipient of such blood products or tissue products.
Id.; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-5 (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation) ("human
tissue").
368. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1481(A)-(B) (West, Westlaw through Ist Special
Sess. and legislation effective Feb. 18 2011 of the First Reg. Sess. of the 15th Leg. (2011)). Arizona
law provides that:
No physician, surgeon, hospital or person who assists a physician, surgeon or hospital in
obtaining, preparing, injecting or transfusing blood or its components from one or more
human beings to another human being shall be liable on the basis of implied warranty or
strict tort liability for any such activity but such person or entity shall be liable for his or
its negligent or willful misconduct. . . . No nonprofit blood bank, tissue bank, donor or
entity who donates, obtains, processes or preserves blood or its components from one or
more human beings for the purpose of transfusing or transferring blood or its components
to another human being shall be liable on the basis of implied warranty or strict tort
liability for any such activity but such person or entity shall be liable for his or its
negligent or wilful misconduct.
Id.; see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 327-51 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. and Spec. Sessions)
(protects transfer of "any tissue").
369. See, e.g., ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1151 (West, Westlaw through Ist Special Sess. and
legislation effective Feb. 18 2011 of the First Reg. Sess. of the 15th Leg. (2011)). Arizona law
determines that blood providers render a service:
The procurement, processing, distribution, or use of whole human blood, plasma, blood
products and blood derivatives for the purpose of injecting or transfusing them into the
human body shall be construed as to the transmission of serum hepatitis to be the
rendition of a service by every person participating therein and shall not be construed to
be a sale.
Id. (emphasis added); see also ALA. CODE § 7-2-314(4) (West, Westlaw through End of 2010 First
Spec. Sess.); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West, Westlaw through all 2010 Reg. Sess.
laws); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-104(2) (West, Westlaw through the end of the Second Reg.
Sess. of the 67th General Assemb. (2010)); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.316(5)-(6) (West, Westlaw
through Chapter 274 (End) of the 2010 Second Reg. Sess. of the Twenty-First Leg. and Chapter 283
of the 2010 Spec. "A" Sess. of the Twenty-Second Leg.); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-2-316(5), 51-1-
28(a) (West, Westlaw through the 2010 Reg. Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-3702 (West, Westlaw
through the end of the 2010 Second Reg. Sess. of the 60th Leg.); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-12-
11(a)(West, Westlaw through the end of the 2010 Second Reg. Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 142C.12
(West, Westlaw through Acts from the 2010 Reg. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.125 (West,
Westlaw through end of 2010 Legis.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2797(A) (West, Westlaw through
the 2010 Reg. Sess.) (includes "human tissue"); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-630 (West,
Westlaw through all chapters of the 2010 Reg. Sess. of the General Assemb., effective through Oct.
1, 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525A.25 (West, Westlaw through the 2010 Second Spec. Sess.);
MISS. CODE ANN § 41-41-1 (West, Westlaw through the 2010 Reg. and Ist and 2nd Extraordinary
Sessions); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.069 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2010 1st Extraordinary
Sess. of the 95th General Assemb.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460.010 (West, Westlaw through the
2009 75th Reg. Sess. and the 2010 26th Spec. Sess. of the Nevada Leg.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-
5 (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (West, Westlaw
through 2010 File 58 of the 128th GA (2009-2010)); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2151 (West,
Westlaw through Chapter 479 (End) of the Second Reg. Sess. of the 52nd Leg. (2010)); R.I. GEN.
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have been widely enacted, they have been criticized as artificial and
inappropriate legal maneuvers.370
Although some blood shield statutes apply only to blood and blood
products,371 others include human tissue within their scope.372 Because
sperm is considered human tissue, the possibility of bringing a products
liability action for genetically defective sperm may be effectively eliminated
in jurisdictions with broad blood shield laws.373 This result, however, fails
to advance the public policy concerns behind the enactment of the blood
shield statutes.374 Furthermore, blood transfusions, by their very nature, are
inherently more compatible with the concept of a service than are sperm
transactions.375 For these reasons, courts may refrain from interpreting
broad blood shield statutes as encompassing sperm transactions.3 76 If Courts
LAWS ANN. § 23-17-30 (West, Westlaw through chapter 320 of the Jan. 2010 sess.); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-43-10 (West, Westlaw through End of the 2010 Reg. Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-31-1
(West, Westlaw through 2010 Gen. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.120 (West, Westlaw
through Laws 2011, chapters I and 2); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-23-1 (West, Westlaw through Laws
of the 2010 Second Extraordinary Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-280 (repealed 2010).
370. See Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 247-48
(1996), arguing that the characterization of blood transfers as a service, rather than a sale:
is designed primarily to avoid the strict product liability rules applicable to the sales of
goods. Accordingly, a blood provider, including a donor, hospital, or blood bank, can be
held liable only for negligence in handling the blood. This solution appears artificial
considering the true nature of blood transactions. If public policy considerations grant
blood providers immunity from strict products liability, then a specific statutory
exemption for blood products, rather than a modification of the transaction, is the best
solution. Another acceptable approach treats blood as an unavoidably unsafe product;
therefore, no test can safely eliminate all the dangers.
371. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1151 (West, Westlaw through 1st Special Sess. and
legislation effective Feb. 18 2011 of the First Reg. Sess. of the 15th Leg. (2011)).
372. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-12-11(a) (West, Westlaw through end of 2010 Second
Reg. Sess.).
373. See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated
Biomedical Innovation, 55 Fla. L. Rev. 603, 647 (2003).
374. McIntyre, supra note 209, at 530 (explaining that "the underlying intent behind most blood
shield statutes was to ensure that the blood supply did not suffer due to donors' fears of being held
accountable if their blood proved to be contaminated. This policy decision was made in view of the
essential role that donated blood plays in our health care system. Donor semen, by contrast, does not
enjoy a comparable status in our society. . . . [U]navailability of donor semen would not create a
national crisis as would occur with a depletion of our blood supply.").
375. Whereas blood transfusions must be administered by a medical professional, insemination
can be performed without assistance: "Because vaginal insemination is simple and does not require
formal training, many women are 'self-inseminating' at home." Swink & Reich, supra note 4, at
861 n.18 (citing Justyn Lezin, (Mis)Conceptions: Unjust Limitations on Legally Unmarried
Women's Access to Reproductive Technology and Their Use of Known Donors, 14 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 185, 193 (2003)).
376. See Noah, supra note 373, at 646 ("Historically, courts have refused to impose strict liability
against providers of professional medical services. In the case of elective-and perhaps aggressively
promoted-health care services such as fertility treatments, however, courts may rethink this
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adopt this interpretation-and in jurisdictions with narrowly tailored blood
shield laws-a plaintiff may be able to bring an action in products liability
against a seller of genetically defective sperm.
C. Taking It to the Bank: Products Liability Actions for Genetically
Defective Sperm
Even if a plaintiff can overcome the hurdles of classifying sperm as a
product and its transfer as a sale, numerous other factors will affect the
success of a products liability action against a seller of genetically defective
sperm: the genetic defect must fit one of the traditional categories of
defect;377 the seller must be a proper defendant;378 the party bringing the
claim must be a proper plaintiff;," and the plaintiff must claim a legally
cognizable injury. 1
Although claims for breach of an express warranty31' or the implied
traditional reluctance."); see also Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Sharing Accountability for Breast Implants:
Strict Products Liability and Medical Professionals Engaged in Hybrid Sales/Service Cosmetic
Products Transactions, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 873 (1994) (suggesting that the justifications for
protection physicians from strict liability are not applicable to cosmetic surgeons implanting
defective nontherapeutic products that cause harm).
377. See infra notes 384-92 and accompanying text.
378. See infra notes 398-402 and accompanying text.
379. See infra notes 405-21 and accompanying text.
380. See infra notes 406-21 and accompanying text.
381. A seller of sperm who makes false representations about the quality of its product may be
liable for breach of express warranty. Sellers of sperm may make various representations through
their advertisements and literature. For instance, California Cryobank advertises that its:
donors are hand-picked and screened intensely before being accepted into our donor
program. The quality of our donors is the foundation of our service, with less than 1% of
all applicants making it through the selection process. Potential donors are subjected to
an exhaustive medical, genetic, and psychological screening-as well as a detailed
examination of their background and family medical history. In fact, it is this superior
qualification process that sets us apart from other sperm banks. Our screening is detailed
and far-reaching to ensure that our clients are provided the best of the best.
CAL. CRYOBANK, http://www.cryobank.com/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2011). Regardless of California
Cryobank's intention, such language constitutes an express warranty. California Cryobank's
Purchase and Storage Agreement provides:
EXCEPT AS SET FORTH IN SECTION 3 (SPECIMEN QUALITY), ALL
CRYOBANK PRODUCTS AND SERVICES ... ARE PROVIDED "AS IS" WITH NO
REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING (BUT NOT LIMITED TO) THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND
NONINFRINGEMENT. IN PARTICULAR (BUT WITHOUT LIMITATION),
CRYOBANK DOES NOT WARRANT THAT SPECIMENS ARE FREE OF GENETIC
DEFECTS OR DISEASES, THAT A PREGNANCY WILL RESULT FROM THE USE
OF A SPECIMEN, OR THAT A CHILD BORN USING A SPECIMEN WILL BE FREE
OF DISEASE OR MENTAL DEFECTS....
Purchase and Storage Agreement, supra note 348. Despite this exculpatory language, the Purchase
and Storage Agreement may not preclude California Cryobank's liability for failure to comply with
its express warranty. For instance, if California Cryobank did not, as it advertised, perform "an
exhaustive medical, genetic, and psychological screening-as well as a detailed examination of their
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warranty of fitness for a particular purpose 3 82 do not involve a showing that
the product is defective,383 a defect is required to establish negligence,
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and strict liability in
tort.3" While the court in Donovan accepted without question that a genetic
defect constitutes a defect for purposes of products liability, 8  genetic
defects do not fit neatly into any of the three standard defect categories in
products liability-manufacturing, design, and warning.386  Defect
classification is crucial to the resolution of a products liability claim because
the standard for evaluating defectiveness varies depending on whether the
product is defective in its manufacture, design, or warnings. 8
In Two Rivers, the court suggested that genetic defects are most akin to
manufacturing defects: "This case presents a flaw in the product in that it
was not improperly designed, but it arrived in a state which did not comport
with its expected condition." 8  Similarly, others have declared that genetic
"defects could be both manufacturing and warning." 389 One might instead
background and family medical history" of its potential donors, its attempt to exclude all warranties
would be inoperable to the extent that the attempted exclusion is inconsistent with the express
warranty. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
382. It is unlikely that a plaintiff will be able to establish a claim against a seller of sperm for
breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The fitness warranty requires that the
buyer have-and the seller be aware of-a special purpose for the product. See supra notes 144-47
and accompanying text. Because sperm has one purpose-to fertilize an egg and produce a resulting
offspring-it would be difficult to establish that the buyer sought to achieve another purchase. One
might, however, argue that she selected a donor with specific characteristics for the special purpose
of producing offspring with those features. See supra note 352 and accompanying text (discussing
California Cryobank's checklist for selecting donor characteristics). This argument is unlikely to be
persuasive, though, "because of the complexity of human genetics, it is generally unclear which
traits will be inherited by the child." L. Thomas Styron, Comment, Artificial Insemination: A New
Frontier for Medical Malpractice and Medical Products Liability, 32 LoY. L. REV. 411, 414 (1986).
The seller, thus, is unlikely to know of the buyer's special purpose.
383. See supra notes 135-50 and accompanying text.
384. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 265-305 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 64-102 and accompanying text.
387. The test for manufacturing defects is whether the product departs from its intended design,
while design defects require a showing that the product should have been designed differently to
make it safer. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1453 nn.60-61 (2010). Warning defects exist when a product is unsafe for
its ordinary use due to inadequate warnings or instructions. See supra notes 64-102 and
accompanying text.
388. Two Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., 624 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1980).
389. Swink & Reich, supra note 4, at 887. Warning defects require that a plaintiff establish that a
better warning could have made the product safer. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. No
warnings or instructions, however, could make genetically defect sperm any safer. Adequate
warnings are nonetheless necessary for purposes of informed consent. See supra note 90 and
accompanying text. A woman who does not know of the risk that a resulting child may inherit a
genetic defect from donor sperm cannot fully consent to AID. But if a woman undergoes
1223
argue that genetic defects are, in effect, design defects.
Genetically defective sperm could be categorized as defective in design
regardless of whether the sperm donor is classified as a manufacturer and the
sperm bank as a distributor,3 90 or whether the sperm donor is considered a
raw material supplier and the sperm bank a manufacturer.39 ' As such,
genetic defects in sperm should be considered design defects, and the
standard for determining whether the sperm is defective is whether it should
have been designed differently to make it safer. 392 The rationale for
imposing liability for defectively designed products is only present,
however, when the sperm bank is considered the manufacturer.39 3
Applying the standard for design defects, the plaintiff must show that
the sperm was in fact defective. The sperm will be defective in negligence if
the plaintiff can show that the seller reasonably should have discovered the
genetic defect but failed to do so. 394  To establish a breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability, the sperm must be unmerchantable at the time
of sale.395 Under strict liability, the test for design defects varies by
insemination with donor sperm despite warnings regarding the possibility that the sperm carries
genetic defects, then the woman effectively assumes that risk. See supra notes 195-97 and
accompanying text.
390. If the sperm donor is considered a manufacturer, then the sperm bank would simply be a
distributor of his product. If the sperm donor carries a genetic defect, however, then the design of
his "product line" is compromised. The genetic defect does not simply affect one batch or lot of his
product-it affects the entire line. He simply manufactures a bad product. When his sperm
produces offspring with genetic defects, this is not caused by the mismanufacture of his product, but
rather by the very nature of his product-sperm that carries a genetic defect. His sperm is
defectively designed.
391. If the sperm donor is treated as a raw material supplier rather that a manufacturer, then the
sperm bank will be considered the manufacturer. Such a classification seems appropriate in light of
the conscious design decisions made by sperm banks in selecting and testing its raw materials.
Although the sperm bank may intend to provide sperm that is free from genetic defects, sperm that in
fact carries such defects may not actually depart from its intended design. Just like automobile
manufacturers intend to make safe cars, actual safety levels depends on the features selected and
tests performed. Where a sperm bank chooses to forego testing for rare genetic disorders, this
represents a conscious design decision. If a child inherits that rare genetic disorder, the genetic
defect is not a manufacturing defect, but rather a design defect reflecting conscious design decisions
that affect the entire product line. Whether such a design is defective depends on whether the sperm
bank should have tested for that rare genetic disorder, based on some combination of a risk-utility
analysis or consumer expectations. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
392. Although a sperm donor is physically unable to alter the design of his sperm, he arguably
should not put such a reasonably unsafe product in the stream of commerce.
393. Because the sperm donor's product only reflects natural processes, that rationale for
imposing liability for design defects-that the injury was caused by the manufacturer's conscious
design decisions-does not apply. In contrast, the sperm bank makes conscious decisions in
selecting and testing the sperm, and so there the rationale would be relevant.
394. If, however, the sperm bank's decision to test only for the most prevalent genetic defects
were reasonable in regard to cost and likelihood of harm, the sperm bank would not be found
negligent, despite selling sperm that carried a genetic defect.
395. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (defining unmerchantable as "not fit for its
ordinary purpose"). Sperm's purpose is to fertilize an egg and produce a resulting child. Although
genetically defective sperm can achieve this purpose, it arguably cannot do so safely, and may thus
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jurisdiction, involving consumer expectations... or a risk utility analysis.397
While a plaintiff "may very well sue any party who had an opportunity
to discover the defect in the semen and failed to do so,"'" the issue of
whether a seller can be liable for providing genetically defective sperm
depends on the asserted basis of liability and the seller's status. Negligence
actions require a showing of individualized fault, with liability attaching
only to parties that have acted unreasonably;3 99 as such, the most likely
target is the sperm bank responsible for selecting and testing the sperm.400
Because of issues associated with sperm donor anonymity, the plaintiff may
have difficulty proving the sperm bank's negligence.40' In contrast, any
be considered unmerchantable.
396. One author suggests that recipients of AID expect "healthy sperm, a safe artificial
insemination process, and ultimately, a healthy child." Ginsberg, supra note 209, at 823. It is
debatable whether such expectations are reasonable in light of evidence that "[t]he rate of genetic
defects in naturally conceived live-born children is approximately six to seven percent. . . ."
McIntyre, supra note 209, at 521. Nonetheless, the fact that some couples use AID to prevent the
transmission of the husband's known genetic defect is revealing of their expectations about the
procedure. See Ginsberg, supra note 209, at 823 ("While the majority of couples use artificial
insemination to overcome fertility problems, many recipients use artificial insemination to avoid
passing a genetic disease to their children."). This purpose is defeated, and a consumer's
expectations may be frustrated, if donors are not adequately tested to prevent the transmission of
genetic diseases and defects.
397. The risk-utility analysis will balance a variety of factors, including the likelihood that a
sperm sample carries the particular genetic defect, the severity of associated disease, and the cost of
testing for the defect.
398. McIntyre, supra note 209, at 521. "This could include the physician who performed the
procedure, the sperm bank that distributed the semen, and the donor himself." Id.
399. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
400. See Anita M. Hodgson, Note, The Warranty of Sperm: A Modest Proposal to Increase the
Accountability of Sperm Banks and Physicians in the Performance of Artificial Insemination
Procedures, 26 IND. L. REv. 357, 369 (1993) ("[Ilt is generally the sperm bank, not the physician,
that selects and screens donors; the physician usually has little or no contact with the donor."). If,
however, a sperm donor provides incomplete or inaccurate information regarding his background
and family history during the application and screening process, he might also be found to be liable
under negligence, as may a physician who procures sperm on behalf of a patient from a disreputable
source.
401. See Blum, supra note 306, at 339-40 ("In order to prove negligence in a tort action, a woman
may need to question the semen donor about whether certain guidelines were followed. The
discovery of information about donors has been an issue in suits against blood banks and hospitals
that have distributed HIV-contaminated blood."). A plaintiff may argue that it is necessary to
interview a sperm donor regarding the screening methods employed by the sperm bank. One author
suggests that "[a] court in a negligence action against a semen bank may allow the discovery of a
semen donor's laboratory reports or answered questionnaires to prove what screening methods were
used. However, it is very unlikely that a court would allow the disclosure of the donor's identity."
Id at 342 (footnote omitted). There may, however, be strong reasons for disclosing a sperm donor's
identity where the donor passed a genetic defect to a child produced through AID. For instance, the
donor's appearance may be relevant to the question of the sperm bank's negligence. The donor's
physical characteristics may exhibit indications that he carries a particular disease. See supra note
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seller in the chain of distribution may be held liable for genetically defective
sperm in implied warranty of merchantability402 and strict liability actions,
so a plaintiff may sue not only the sperm bank, but also the sperm donor and
administering physician.403 Furthermore, while any blameworthy seller of
genetically defective sperm may be held liable in negligence, only a seller
who regularly engages in sperm sales can be liable under the implied
warranty of merchantability or strict liability in tort.404
Products liability claims for genetically defective sperm may be brought
by an AID recipient, her spouse,405 or the resulting child. The AID
recipient's claim 40 6 can be characterized as one of wrongful birth. 407  In
contrast with a direct injury to the AID recipient,408 the injury caused by a
wrongful birth is the denial of the recipient's opportunity to make an
informed decision regarding whether or not to have the child. 409  Because
wrongful birth is not legally accepted in all states, 41 0 an AID recipient may
be unable to establish her prima facie case in states unwilling to recognize
her injury. 4 11 An AID recipient must also be cognizant of the statutory
280 (describing the physical characteristics of a Fragile X carrier).
402. Sellers may, however, escape liability by disclaiming the implied warranty of
merchantability. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
403. Thus, even if a physician has no opportunity to test the sperm and simply procures it from a
sperm bank claiming to vigorously test the product, he can be held liable under implied warranty of
merchantability or strict liability. Where, however, sperm is purchased directly by a consumer from
a sperm bank and only shipped to a physician's office for the procedure, the administering physician
may not be considered part of the chain of distribution. See supra notes 353-62 and accompanying
text.
404. See supra notes 156-86 and accompanying text. If a sperm donor only sells his sperm
sporadically, it is unlikely that he will satisfy the requirement of being a seller regularly engaged in
sales of that kind of product. See supra note 156. If, however, he instead donates three times per
week, as suggested by California Cryobank, he would likely be subject to liability under the implied
warranty of merchantability and strict liability. See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
405. See McIntyre, supra note 209, at 521 n.14 ("[T]hese claims can theoretically be brought by
both the birth mother of a child conceived through artificial insemination and her husband (since the
husband is treated as the legal father of the child in most states)." (citation omitted)).
406. For purposes of simplification, this Comment does not separately address the recipient's
claim and the spouse's claim because the spouse's claim is a derivative of the recipient's claim.
407. See supra note 304 and accompanying text (recounting the Donovan court's suggestion that
Donna Donovan could have brought a wrongful birth claim had the statutory period not expired).
408. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 306 (considering the potential for tort liability when an AID
recipient contracts HIV through artificial insemination).
409. Wrongful birth claims are "brought by the parents of a child born with severe defects against
a physician who negligently fails to inform them . . . of an increased possibility that the mother will
give birth to such a child, thereby precluding an informed decision as to whether to have the child."
Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 344 (N.H. 1986). "The most common measure of damages in
wrongful birth cases is the extraordinary medical and educational expenses which the parents will
incur due to the child's mental or physical handicaps." McIntyre, supra note 209, at 540.
410. Wrongful birth was recognized by twenty-two states as of 2002. See Kelly E. Rhinehart, The
Debate Over Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life, 26 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 141, 142 (2002). Three
states--Georgia, Michigan, and North Carolina-have explicitly rejected wrongful birth claims. Id.
411. See supra note 302-03 and accompanying text (describing the Donovan court's dismissal of
Brittany's action for failure to state a claim because she could not allege a legally cognizable injury,
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period in which she can bring a claim, which is likely to begin as soon as she
knows or has reason to know of the defect and its source.412 Although the
state recognizes wrongful birth claims and the statutory period has not
expired, the AID recipient's claim may be denied if the defendant
successfully argues that she assumed the risk.413
Even if the AID recipient assumed the risk of being inseminated with
genetically defective sperm, this may not adversely affect the resulting
child's claim. 4 14  Likewise, if the recipient's statutory period to bring an
action has expired, the child may still have time to initiate a claim if the
jurisdiction has a minor's tolling statute.4 15 Nonetheless, the child may face
other obstacles to recovery, most of which, however, can be overcome.
In negligence actions, defendants may argue that they owe no duty of
care to the potential offspring created through AID; however, "it is hard to
accept that an artificial insemination practitioner, sperm bank, and sperm
donor owe no duty of care whatsoever to the child whose conception they
are actively seeking." 4 16 While defendants may argue that the child was not
a party to the contract between the AID recipient and the sperm bank, the
child will likely be granted third-party beneficiary status as to the
where New York does not recognize wrongful life claims).
412. See supra note 284 and accompanying text (discussing the discovery rule for tolling the
statutory period).
413. Whether the recipient assumed the risk would be a question of fact for the jury. See supra
notes 196-97 and accompanying text. The defendant would have to prove that the recipient was
both subjectively aware of the risk and encountered it voluntarily. See supra notes 196-97 and
accompanying text. The defendant might argue that "[d]espite significant advances in medical
technology over the past quarter-century, the detection and prevention of genetic defects and
diseases is not one hundred percent." Hodgson, supra note 400, at 383. Nonetheless, the
determination of whether the recipient actually assumed the risk would likely depend on how
broadly or narrowly the risk is framed (for example, the possibility that the resulting child would
inherit a genetic defect, as opposed to the possibility that the resulting child would inherit that
specific genetic defect) and the recipient's expectations regarding the testing. See supra note 309
and accompanying text (describing a case in which the resulting child inherited cystic fibrosis
despite assurances by the sperm bank that they tested for the condition).
414. See Noah, supra note 373, at 642 ("[E]xpress assumption of risk by a patient probably would
not bar a claim brought on behalf of a child."). "Any assumption of risk or comparative negligence
by [the mother], even if valid defenses . . . , typically would not be imputed to her [child]." Id at
642-43; see also id. at 645 (discussing the effect of intrafamily immunities in relation to third-party
claims for contribution).
415. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5533(b)(1)(i-ii) (Purdon, Westlaw through 2010 Reg.
and Ist Special Sess.); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 202 (McKinney, Westlaw through 2010 legislation).
416. McIntyre, supra note 209, at 538. Support for the position that the defendants do in fact owe
a duty of due care to the potential offspring produced through AID can be found in existing case law.
See, e.g., Huddleston v. Infertility Ctr. Of Am., Inc., 700 A.2d 453, 460 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)
(holding that a surrogacy business "must be held accountable for the foreseeable risks of the
surrogacy undertaking because a 'special relationship' exists between the surrogacy business, its
client-participants, and, most especially, the child which the surrogacy undertaking creates.").
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contract.4 17 Although a sperm donor named as a defendant may try to claim
parental immunity, this defense is unlikely to succeed since many states
have adopted statutes that determine legal parentage. 41 8  The most
significant obstacle to the resulting child's claim will be the characterization
of the child's injury as one of wrongful life. 4 19 Because wrongful life claims
are only recognized in three states-California, New Jersey, and
Washington 420-the resulting child's claim will often be barred for failure to
assert a legally cognizable injury.42 1
Despite numerous obstacles and jurisdictional variables, an AID
recipient, her spouse, or the resulting child may be able to bring a products
liability action against a seller of genetically defective sperm. Products
liability may not, however, be the most appropriate or effective mechanism
for regulating AID. Because AID is likely to be the subject of future
litigation, further consideration should be given to alternative methods of
regulation.
IV. DONOVAN REVISITED: SOWING THE SEEDS OF DISSENT
Regardless of whether current law permits products liability actions for
417. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
418. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
419. See McIntyre, supra note 209, at 539. Some authors have suggested that:
[A] child who is born with [a genetic] disease has experienced, and will experience,
several legally recognized and compensable injuries: she has been damaged in her
enjoyment of life, has suffered and will suffer physical and mental pain, has endured past
medical expenses, and is likely to incur future medical expenses.
Swink & Reich, supra note 4, at 887. This, however, misframes the injury. In wrongful life actions,
the injury claimed is not the genetic defect that the child suffers, but rather "it is the birth of plaintiff
with such defect." Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829 (Cal. App. 1980); see
also China R. Rosas, A Necessary Compromise: Recognizing the Rights of a Donated Generation to
Tame the Wild Wild West of California's Sperm Banking Industry, 37 Sw. U. L. REV. 393, 413
(2008) (quoting Susan L. Crockin, Reproductive Genetics: Conceiving New Wrongs?, 3 SEXUALITY,
REPROD. & MENOPAUSE 37, 37 (2005)) ("Donor offspring asserting wrongful life claims are
claiming that 'but for professionals' actions or inactions [they] would not have been born.'
Generally speaking, both claims lead to a conclusion that if certain genetic tests had been conducted,
the decision to bring a child into this world would have been different.... [M]ost states 'refuse to
recognize wrongful life claims on the theory that any life is better than none, and because public
policy frowns on assigning damages for a life."').
420. Rhinehart, supra note 410, at 152; see also Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982);
Moscatello v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 776 A.2d 874 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 2001);
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
Many courts have rejected wrongful life based on the difficulty in determining damages.
The goal of damages in tort law is compensatory, putting the plaintiff in the position that
he was in before the negligent conduct. Consequently, in a wrongful life suit, the
position the plaintiff would have been in if the tort had not occurred would be
nonexistence.
Rhinehart, supra note 410, at 155.
421. See supra notes 298-303 and accompanying text (describing the Donovan court's decision
that Brittany's claim was one of wrongful life).
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genetically defective sperm, it is necessary to consider whether such claims
are appropriate and effective in achieving the primary goals of products
liability law. While negligence actions require a showing of individualized
fault, both the implied warranty of merchantability and strict liability in tort
hold all sellers in the chain of distribution liable irrespective of fault.422
Because sperm banks are in the best position to screen donors and test the
423
sperm, it is not only unfair to hold physicians and sperm donors liable
without fault, but it also defeats a primary rationale for products liability-
the reduction of risks and accident costs. 424 Similarly, imposing strict legal
liability for genetic defects that are impossible to diagnose or are yet
undiscovered at the time of insemination does not effectively advance these
policy objectives.425
Because the injury caused by genetically defective sperm is not strictly
classified as "personal injury," sperm banks may effectively exclude
damages caused by genetically defective sperm through exculpatory clauses
in their contracts.426 Regardless of the enforceability of such provisions,
plaintiffs may believe that the broad disclaiming language included in sperm
bank waivers427 bars their claims against the sperm bank. As a result, they
may be inclined to pursue other parties in the chain of distribution 42 1 -
422. See supra notes 151-92 and accompanying text.
423. See supra note 400 and accompanying text.
424. See supra note 90 and accompanying text; see also Stephen P. Teret & Michael Jacobs,
Prevention and Torts: The Role of Litigation in Injury Control, 17 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 17,
17 (1989) ("Prevention of injuries, then, deals with man's control over his own creations. It deals
with providing incentives or requirements for product makers and others to anticipate hazards and to
reduce them to the extent feasible. These incentives and requirements are usually created through
the legal system. They can come in the form of legislation, regulation, or litigation.").
425. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 190, at 273 ("However tempting it may be for courts
to hold distributors 'strictly' liable for unknowable risks, doing so prevents the achievement of either
of two contrasting objectives underlying tort law, as identified by the majority of commentators.").
426. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (explaining that damages may be excluded or
limited, except where they involve injury to the person).
427. See supra note 381 and accompanying text.
428. William Prosser described plaintiffs' inclination to sue various parties in the chain of
distribution when the primarily responsible party is out of reach:
There are other sellers than the manufacturer of the product. It will pass through the
hands of a whole line of other dealers, and the plaintiff may have good reason to sue any
or all of them. The manufacturer is often beyond the jurisdiction. He may even, in some
cases, be unknown. If he is identified and can be sued, it is very often impossible to pin
the liability upon him. Even where there is a proved defect which speaks of obvious
negligence on the part of some one, it may still not be possible to prove that it was on the
part of the maker. The cracked Coca Cola bottle may have been cracked long after it left
his plant. And even when the cause can be fixed upon the manufacturer, he may turn out,
in these days of chain stores and large supply houses, to be a small concern, operating on
a shoestring, and financially the least responsible person in the whole chain of
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namely the sperm donor or the physician-whose conduct is not as
blameworthy as that of the sperm bank.429
It is similarly unfair to hold a diligent sperm bank liable for failing to
detect a condition that is extremely rare, impossible to detect, or not yet
discovered at the time of insemination. "In light of the fact that more than
2,000 genetic diseases exist,"430 even with strong screening and testing
standards, there is a chance that a child produced through AID will inherit a
genetic defect 431:
Although there are a variety of tests capable of detecting many
diseases and genetic defects in sperm donors, a child could still be
born with a defect or disease despite every possible precaution on
the part of the sperm bank and physician. Thus, if strict liability in
its traditional form were applied to commercial sperm transactions,
the result would be a virtual "warranty on human life." 432
Because testing for all rare conditions may be prohibitively expensive,
liability should be limited to a sperm seller's failure to identify defects that
are reasonably capable of detection.433 Rather than imposing strict liability
on sellers of genetically defective sperm, courts should instead apply a
shifted burden of proof to claims brought in negligence. 434
A. The Sterile Doctrine ofStrict Liability
The doctrine of strict liability was adopted to relieve plaintiffs of the
distribution. If the plaintiff is to recover at all, he must often look to the wholesaler, the
jobber, and the retailer.
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, supra note 187, at 1116-17.
429. Although the sperm donor's misrepresentation of his family medical history would of course
constitute blameworthy conduct, it would be unfair to hold him liable for transmitting a genetic
disease that he has no reason to know that he carries; if a lifetime of health examinations has not
revealed his condition, he cannot reasonably be expected to know of it. Similarly, the physician will
likely never even meet the sperm donor and will thus have limited opportunities to discover a defect.
See supra note 400 and accompanying text. Some commentators suggest that strict liability
encourages sellers to "take appropriate care" and sell their products at "a price reflecting accident
losses." Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1980). However,
knowing that other parties in the chain of distribution may absorb the costs of injuries caused by
defective sperm, sperm banks may be more inclined to forego certain screening and testing
measures.
430. Ginsberg, supra note 209, at 845.
431. See Ginsberg, supra note 209, at 845 ("Each person carries between three and five lethal
recessive genes, and, therefore, may carry some deleterious genetic disease gene.").
432. Hodgson, supra note 400, at 383.
433. One possibility for precluding recovery where detection of a genetic defect is not feasible
involves the classification of sperm as an "unavoidably unsafe product." See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965) (denying recovery under strict liability for unavoidably
unsafe products).
434. See infra notes 442-51 and accompanying text.
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considerable difficulties that they face in proving negligence in products
liability claims.435 In effect, strict liability shifts the plaintiffs burden of
proof to the seller of a defective product based on the notion that the seller is
in a better position to describe its actions:
Strict liability shifts the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the
manufacturer. A plaintiff lacks the information necessary to say
exactly how a product was defective: a user does not know how the
product was made or whether the manufacturer acted unreasonably.
Manufacturers have such knowledge. As applied, products liability
serves as a rebuttable presumption of fault on the part of the
manufacturer, which tends to bring out the truth.436
Strict liability, unfortunately, goes considerably further than simply shifting
the burden of proof and is thus an inappropriate cause of action for sales of
genetically defective sperm.437
Negligence, however, resolves the problems of applying strict liability
to claims involving the sale of genetically defective sperm.438 In negligence,
a seller of sperm will only be liable if shown to have individually engaged in
blameworthy conduct.439 Furthermore, a seller will not be held liable for
providing genetically defective sperm if the defect could not have
reasonably been detected.o40 A fault-based standard imposes incentives for
435. See I OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 400 ("[S]trict liability was proposed as a mechanism
for alleviating the difficulties of proof in a negligence case and thus is typically preferable to a
negligence action.").
436. Anita Bernstein, Product Dynamism and the Law, in MEANING, MEASURE, AND MORALITY
OF MATERIALISM 115 (Floyd Rudmin & Marsha Richins eds., 1992); see also Barker v. Lull Eng'g
Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978) ("[Courts] have repeatedly emphasized that one of the principal
purposes behind the strict product liability doctrine is to relieve an injured plaintiff of many of the
onerous evidentiary burdens inherent in a negligence cause of action.").
437. Strict liability holds all sellers in the chain of distribution liable regardless of individualized
fault. See supra notes 173-92 and accompanying text.
438. See infra notes 439-41 and accompanying text.
439. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
440. See I OWEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 633, discussing the relationship between actions in
negligence and a seller's ability to reduce risks and accident costs:
State of the art evidence is highly relevant to the negligence issue, because such evidence
and negligence claims are predicated on a manufacturer's ability to prevent product
accidents.... [T]he state of the art issue usually concerns either: (1) the foreseeability of
a particular risk of which the plaintiff claims the defendant failed to warn, or (2) the
feasibility of modifying a design in a particular manner to eliminate a risk of which the
manufacturer was aware. In a negligent warnings case, if a risk is 'unknowable,' it is
'unforeseeable' and so lies outside the manufacturer's duty to avoid. In a negligent
design case, if the manufacturer had no practical ability to eliminate a danger, then the
burden on the manufacturer to avoid the injury outweighs virtually any risk of harm.
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sellers of sperm to act reasonably, and these features of negligence function
to advance the primary policy objectives of reducing risks and accident
costs."'
Unfortunately, traditional negligence actions preserve the considerable
evidentiary burdens that inspired the creation of the doctrine of strict
liability. 4 42 The rationale for shifting the burden of proof from a plaintiff to
a seller in a strict liability action is especially apparent in the context of AID,
where the donor is often anonymous and the plaintiff has little information
available regarding the precise screening and testing methods employed by
the sperm bank.443 Although it is very possible that a genetic defect may be
transmitted through donor sperm without any negligence at all on the part of
the sperm bank, sperm donor, or recipient's physician, the sperm seller is in
a uniquely superior position to rebut a presumption of negligence. 4
To reduce risks and create incentives for preventing the transmission of
genetic defects, liability for providing genetically defective sperm should be
based on the seller's fault."5  Because of the plaintiffs severe evidentiary
burdens arising out of donor anonymity, the seller should, however, have the
burden of proving that the screening and testing methods employed were
reasonable.446 Therefore, in AID litigation, courts should adopt a negligence
standard with a shifted burden of proof."7 The presence of a genetic defect
441. See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 645 (1980) ("The primary goal
underlying any standard of liability for product-related injuries resulting from defective design
should be, not compensation, but the reduction of the incidence of injuries. As a matter of rational
social policy, it is of foremost importance to build into the rule of law an approach aimed at
deterring conduct that exposes consumers and users to unreasonable risks of harm. . . . Broadly
spreading the risk of product-related injuries, without more, meets only a secondary goal of
compensating injured plaintiffs. Only by fusing the rule of law governing design cases to a notion of
faulty conduct will the rationale of providing manufacturers with a true incentive to design safer
products have any meaning.").
442. See supra notes 435-36 and accompanying text.
443. See infra note 444 and accompanying text.
444. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (describing the Michigan case in which the
treating specialist for five children diagnosed with SCN could not test his theory that the anonymous
sperm donor carried the defective gene only in his sperm cells because the sperm donor could not be
located and his additional samples could not be tested without his consent). In the Michigan case, if
the sperm donor did not carry the gene only in his sperm cells, he would have exhibited symptoms of
his condition, and it would have been detectable. In that case, the sperm bank might have been
negligent for failing to detect the defect. The children would be unable, however, to prove the sperm
bank's negligence because they could not identify and examine the anonymous sperm donor.
Similarly, in the Donovan case, although the sperm bank may have acted reasonably in foregoing
tests for a rare condition, it may have been negligent in failing to identify symptoms of Fragile X
exhibited by the sperm donor. See supra note 280 and accompanying text (explaining that male
Fragile X carriers generally exhibit severe symptoms). The Donovans, however, would be unable to
prove the sperm bank's negligence without access to the anonymous sperm donor.
445. See supra note 441 and accompanying text.
446. See supra notes 442-44 and accompanying text.
447. Support for a shifted burden of proof can be found in the rationale for imposing strict
liability, as discussed above, and in other case law. See, e.g., Brousseau v. Rosenthal, 443 N.Y.S.2d
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in offspring produced through AID should raise a rebuttable presumption of
a seller's negligence."' The seller may then offer evidence that its conduct
was reasonable." 9
Applying a negligence standard with a shifted burden of proof may
require sperm banks to adjust their conduct such that their transactions are
less like a consumer-driven sale of goods and more like the rendering of a
professional service. Due to the complexities of reproduction, the
implementation of a uniform system for the screening and testing of donors
for genetic defects may, by itself, be insufficient. Instead, sperm banks may
be expected to screen both donors and recipients. 450 Based on a recipient's
unique genetic makeup and medical history, a sperm bank may, in some
cases, be negligent for screening, but failing to test, the selected sperm for
any diseases for which the recipient is predisposed to a higher carrier rate.451
Finally, although plaintiffs may be expected to prefer bringing claims in
strict liability, Paul Rheingold suggests that they may actually have more
success with the fault-based language of negligence:
In McLuenesque terms negligence is "hot" and strict liability is
"cold." It is easier to prevail by showing that the defendant did
something wrong than that there is something technically defective
about the product. It is easier to win (and collect substantial
damages) by showing that a drug company concealed information
about side effects than to show that in fact there was no warning on
the labeling about the risks.452
285, 285 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980) (holding that "defendant's failure to return the bailed dog
presumptively establishes his negligence, shifting the burden of proving due care to the defendant-
bailee").
448. See supra note 444 and accompanying text.
449. Such evidence may include statistics demonstrating that a condition is extremely rare,
evidence that the cost of testing for rare defects is prohibitively expensive, or information obtained
through donor screening indicating that the donor likely did not carry the defective gene.
450. Some genetic disorders are inherited in an autosomal recessive pattern, meaning that the
condition is caused by the "inheritance of a defective gene from two carrier parents. The chance of
an affected child is I in 4 or 25% for each pregnancy." Div. OF MED. GENETICS EMORY UNIV. SCH.
OF MED., BASIC ASHKENAZI GENETIC DISEASE SCREEN (TAY SACHS, CANAVAN DISEASE, FAMILIAL
DYSAUTONOMIA, CYSTIC FIBROSIS) (2005), available at http://genetics.emory.edu/pdf/Emory
HumanGenetics Basic AJPanel.PDF.
451. Some ethnic groups have higher carrier rates than the general population for certain genetic
diseases. For example, persons with Ashkenazi Jewish ancestry have a carrier rate of one in thirty
for Tay Sachs, one in thirty-six for Canavan Disease, one in thirty for Familial Dysautonomia, and
one in twenty-nine for Cystic Fibrosis. Id. Sperm banks may likewise be negligent for screening,
but failing to test, donors from these ethnic groups for related genetic diseases. See id.
452. Paul D. Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: A Primer, 2 HOFSTRA
1233
Thus, a plaintiff may actually have a better chance of recovery using the
"hot" language of negligence instead of the sterile language of strict liability.
B. Ties that Bind: The Necessity ofa National Donor Database
Litigation alone is insufficient to effectively resolve the problems
caused by the inadequate regulation of the sperm banking industry. While
the FDA regulations geared towards the prevention of transmitting
communicable diseases through donor sperm are a step in the right direction,
they are not enough.453 The establishment of a national donor database is
necessary to reduce the risk of transmitting genetic defects to children
produced through AID.454
While some sperm banks self-regulate by limiting the number of
pregnancies per donor, there is nothing to stop a sperm donor from donating
to multiple sperm banks and potentially fathering hundreds of children. 455 A
national donor database could set important limits on sperm donations and
pregnancies per donor by utilizing nationwide tracking.456
Additionally, regulations could impose a continuing duty to warn on
sperm donors and sperm banks, requiring the disclosure of genetic
conditions discovered later in life.457 In light of the possibility that an AID
recipient may purchase and store numerous vials of donor sperm for future
use,458 a continuing duty to warn may prevent recipients from using stored
sperm after the donor's sperm has been found to carry a genetic defect. 459
The establishment of a donor database and nationwide limitations on
sperm donations could even serve to reduce the likelihood of genetic
L. REV. 521, 531 (1974); see also Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 41, at 429 ("[The] focus of
modem products liability law expressly upon the products-both the one which caused the injury,
and some hypothetical one of proper safety-thus tends to direct the liability issue into a barren,
technologically based determination.").
453. See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text.
454. See infra notes 455-62 and accompanying text; see also Cahn, Necessary Subjects, supra
note 261 (advocating the establishment of a mandatory national donor databank).
455. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Cahn, Accidental Incest, supra note 234,
at 60-61.
456. As evidenced by the case in Michigan in which five children with SCN were all treated by
the same specialist, it is possible that AID offspring will meet their half-siblings. See supra notes I-
5 and accompanying text. In the event that even healthy half-siblings unknowingly procreate, their
children could suffer significant health consequences as a result of inbreeding. Limitations on
pregnancies per donor will reduce the possibility of this result.
457. A continuing duty to warn may assist in the prompt diagnosis of a condition in AID offspring
and may even enable the offspring to make informed lifestyle decisions that can affect the
progression of a condition, such as diabetes. See also supra note 312 and accompanying text
(discussing late-onset genetic conditions, such as Huntington's disease).
458. See supra note 361 and accompanying text.
459. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (recounting International Cryogenics's reasoning for
failing to notify other recipients of Donor F827's sperm after it was discovered to carry the gene for
SCN).
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abnormalities in future generations. If a sperm donor's offspring discovers
that he is a carrier of a genetic disease inherited from his father, other
offspring who learn of the condition through the database may get tested or
take other precautions to reduce the likelihood of passing that condition to
their own children. Furthermore, nationwide donation limitations may also
reduce the risk of "inadvertent inbreeding." 4 60
Because current FDA regulations requiring that sperm be tested for
communicable diseases have already imposed registration requirements,
additional oversight for a donor database would not be impracticable:
The promulgation of FDA regulations has added considerable
oversight to gamete and embryo donation, including mandatory
registration of all assisted reproductive technology (ART) programs
with the federal government, federal inspections of programs that
are performing donation, required documentation, and written
protocols attendant to donor screening, testing, selection, rejection,
and follow-up. Complete records of all donor cycles, including
documentation of adherence to FDA regulations, must be made
available to FDA inspectors at their request. 4 6 1
Sperm banks must already compile and maintain donor information to
ensure that AID recipients are not harmed by the procedure. 462 A national
databank that tracks donor pregnancies and donors' genetic conditions
would further protect public health and safety by providing for the offspring
produced through AID.463
Although some donor offspring registries already exist, they are
insufficient because they do not uniformly track and maintain information
related to donors' genetic conditions. 464 A mandatory national donor
database is a necessary step in reducing the risk of transmitting genetic
defects to children produced through AID.
460. Cahn, Accidental Incest, supra note 234, at 59-60. Half-siblings who share a donor father
could potentially meet and reproduce without knowledge of their relation-causing severe genetic
abnormalities in their children. The likelihood of this possibility is higher in the absence of laws
limiting the number of pregnancies per donor or requiring donor-tracking. See Vanessa L. Pi,
Comment, Regulating Sperm Donation: Why Requiring Exposed Donation is Not the Answer, 16
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 379, 381 (2009).
461. 2008 Guidelines, supra note 217, at S30.
462. See supra note 461 and accompanying text.
463. See supra notes 455-60 and accompanying text.
464. See, e.g., Braverman, supra note 234, at 486.
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V. CONCLUSION
AID offers infertile heterosexual couples, lesbian couples, and
unmarried women the opportunity to realize the dream of a family. 465 While
AID has gained acceptance and popularity as an alternative means of
achieving conception, it has simultaneously raised novel legal issues that
must be resolved to protect the health and safety of the resulting offspring.466
Because, however, the sperm banking industry has remained enveloped in
secrecy and anonymity, the field remains largely unregulated.467 Although
strict liability is neither appropriate nor effective as a mechanism for
regulating AID, a shifted burden of proof in negligence actions can address
proof problems without treating sellers of sperm as virtual insurers of human
life. 4 68 Finally, the adoption of a national donor database can serve to
address additional challenges associated with the practice of AID.469
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465. See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
466. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
467. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
468. See supra notes 422-52 and accompanying text.
469. See supra notes 454-64 and accompanying text.
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